Dear Reader,

Welcome to the Fall 2016 Issue of the GATE Journal. This is a particularly special issue for me, as it is my premier publication as Editor in Chief. I inherited the position from the two individuals that founded the journal in 2014. Even with the trust and guidance of the past editors, this publication season was difficult for me. When I took over as Editor in Chief, I truly had no idea what I was getting into. I had worked for GATE for a year as a copy editor but had limited experience with content editing. I had no clue how to work our layout and graphic design software. I was not prepared to enter the mind numbing bureaucracy of the student government, as I navigated the system and designed a budget for our organization.

Coming into the semester, my goal was to do exactly what the past editors had done the previous semester. If I could seamlessly weave one semester into the next, I would count the transition as a success. But, I’ll admit, there were many moments where I thought this was not going to happen. I struggled to find a full staff for the editorial board. Scrambled to receive enough submissions to start the publication process. Spent many nights staying up late and writing email after email, keeping up with all our editors and authors. Had a minor breakdown when I thought we were losing our website and our funding. And watched, anxiously, as I pushed the deadlines back more and more.

However, here we are. We did it! And what I’ve realized is that this journal is not about the what. Sure, what we do is great. We publish amazing, student-written articles. This issue’s articles explore everything from an analyzation of the Israeli targeted killing policy, to Iran’s hegemonic expansion, to German and Japanese brutality during WWII, and all the way to research on the refugee resettlement process in the United States. However, I argue that our, “why” is much more important. Why does our journal exist? Why do we do what we do?

The GATE Journal exists to provide the ASU community with an academic platform for publishing scholarly pieces on global affairs, and, in turn, establish the ASU community as a thought leader on issues across the globe; To bridge the gap between the theoretical approaches of academia and real-world, empirical implications in relation to global affairs; To promote the critical analysis and understanding of global issues that span across national boundaries and various sectors of research; To provide students the opportunity to participate in the academic process of substantive peer-review. This is what I kept in mind in the moments when I thought that we would not make it. Because, ultimately, if we keep our “why” in mind, we cannot fail.

So as you read, know that this journal is much more than the articles it publishes. It is a compilation of the incredible GATE staff’s hard work and passion. We are honored to share our “why” with you today.

Chloe Miracle Rutledge
Editor in Chief
GATE Network:
Global Affairs Organizations and Centers at ASU

Model United Nations
MUN is an academic competition in which students can learn about diplomacy, international relations, and the United Nations. For more information, email model unasu@gmail.com or visit http://munasu.org.

Students Supporting Israel
Students Supporting Israel is a Pro-Israel international campus movement that is committed to promoting a better understanding of Israel throughout North America as a member of the family of nations, with a fundamental right to exist as a Jewish, democratic state, within secure borders. For more information, contact their FaceBook page at Students Supporting Israel at Arizona State University or visit http://www.ssimovement.org.

J Street U
J Street U is the organizing arm of JStreet, the political home for pro-Israel, pro-peace Americans. For more information, email zbstein@asu.edu or visit https://www.facebook.com/jsstreetasu.

Students for Justice in Palestine
SJP is an anti-Zionist, pro-Palestinian college student activism organization. For more information, email sjipalestine48@gmail.com or visit http://sjipalestine.com.

Alexander Hamilton Society
The AHS is an independent, non-partisan, not for profit organization dedicated to promoting constructive debate on basic principles and contemporary issues in foreign, economic, and national security policy. For more information, email shaykhatiri@gmail.com or visit https://www.facebook.com/AHSatASU

Students Organize for Syria
Students Organize for Syria is a student led movement on a mission to assist the Syrian people. For more information, email sosfreedom.asu@gmail.com or visit http://organize-syria.asu.edu.

Center for the Future of War
The center explores the social, political, economic, and cultural implications of the changing nature of war and conflict. For more information, email futureofwar@asu.edu or visit https://futureofwar.asu.edu.

Center on Religion and Conflict
The center is a research hub that promotes interdisciplinary research and education on the dynamics of religion and conflict with the aim of advancing knowledge, seeking solutions and informing policy. For more information, email csrcaasu.edu or visit https://csrcaasu.edu.

United Students Against Sweatshops
United Students Against Sweatshops is a national grassroots organization that works in solidarity with working people's struggles locally and globally. For more information, visit https://www.facebook.com/asuSEED/ or https://usas.org.

ASU Council for Arab and Islamic Studies
CAIS is an organization that works to acknowledge the significant contributions of Arabic Studies and Islamic civilization and cultures to the world at large both historically and in the modern age. For more information, email CAIS@asu.edu or visit https://cais.asu.edu.

Oxfam
Oxfam is an international confederation of 17 organizations working in approximately 94 countries worldwide to find solutions to poverty and what it considers injustice around the world. For more information, visit https://www.facebook.com/oxfamclubsasu.

Model African Union
Model African Union is a simulation of the African Union, providing a platform for young leaders to explore the inner workings of the African Union, and to practice international diplomacy by assuming the roles of African leaders. For more information, email anderson.nyaga@asu.edu or visit https://www.facebook.com/Model-African-Union-at-ASU-147176196333353.

2B1United
2B1 is a campaign aimed at countering the recruiting success of violent extremism, as well as dismantling the 'War on Islam' narrative. For more information, visit https://www.instagram.com/2B1United.
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CONFRONTING COMPULSORY VICTIMHOOD

Has Journalism Caught Up With the WPS Agenda?

Carolina Marques de Mesquita
In August, I began a student research fellowship with New America, a DC-based think tank partnered with ASU’s Center on the Future of War. What interested me about the project I was assigned to was its emphasis on making gender a central consideration in national security, as opposed to a secondary one - hence the project title, “Not Secondary, But Central”.

The project follows up on the Women, Peace, and Security agenda, which was introduced in October of 2000 when the United Nations signed Resolution 1325. The agenda expresses a particular need for the UN to recognize how conflict adversely affects women and children, and at the time of its signing, was widely recognized as a major step forward for women in foreign policy. Gender mainstreaming, which emphasizes a need to consider how policy impacts men and women differently, had finally been recognized as fundamental to successful peace and security policy. Even more notable was the agenda’s recognition of “the importance of [women’s] equal participation and full involvement in all efforts for the maintenance and promotion of peace and security, and the need to increase their role in decision-making with regard to conflict prevention and resolution.”

16 years later, many scholars in the fields of women’s studies, development studies, and political science are concerned with evaluating the success of this agenda. This is also the concern of Not Secondary, But Central, which hopes to release a toolkit on the topic in early 2017. One component of this toolkit will be a media analysis I’ve developed over the course of the last several months. Since September, I’ve examined how journalists in The New York Times, The Washington Post, and The Wall Street Journal represent women in conflict zones such as Iraq, Afghanistan, South Sudan, and Syria. By reviewing the search results for terms such as “Iraq + women” or “Afghanistan + women + peace”, I’ve sought to find patterns in these representations and evaluate whether journalism has caught up with the Women, Peace, and Security agenda.

Unfortunately, many of my findings indicate that gender certainly remains a secondary consideration in reporting on international conflict. Women and their unique challenges during conflict often remain parenthetical to the “real” conflict at hand. Consider, for example, a May 2016 article in my sampling published by The Wall Street Journal. The headline reads: “Series of Bombs in Syria Hit Assad Stronghold, Killing Dozens”. As details unfold, the piece includes mention of an incident earlier in the month, when “a maternity ward in the regime-held side of Aleppo city was attacked with rockets, killing several women and children.”

Unfortunately, the insignificant inclusion of women in the above example is not isolated, and represents the extent of women’s inclusion across many of the other publications I examined as well. Further, throughout my research, my most troubling discovery was that women are most frequently represented as casualty victims or victims of sexual violence. For example, as many as 34% of the articles in my sampling of the New York Times featured women as victims of sexual violence, while only 17% featured women as political actors.

Considering sexual violence is, of course, critical to any analysis of the gendered impacts of war and conflict. In South Sudan, for example, where a brutal civil war rages, the mass rape of civilian women is often rationalized by ethnic divisions and used as a weapon of war. Nonetheless, I was surprised to find that across all publications in my analysis, South Sudanese women were represented almost exclusively in relation to sexual violence, and that little

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consideration was given to the other challenges these women might face: illiteracy, difficulty accessing critical resources, etc. Furthermore, what might these women's thoughts be on the ethnic violence sweeping this recently emancipated country? What singular insights could they provide on the conflict given their unique positions within this violent context? It was certainly difficult to tell, as these women rarely spoke for themselves when featured in the articles I examined: generally, journalists, politicians, and UN personnel spoke for them instead, offering their own input on the effects of violence against women in the country.

These findings certainly made me ask myself whether the WPS agenda has truly reframed women's roles in foreign policy. Women's notable absence as political actors and peacebuilders across the media that I examined further pushed this question. Women are often barred from political processes in the regions that I examined. Nonetheless, women's informal participation in politics is critical and pervasive around the world, yet these efforts were also unrecognized throughout the publications that I examined. My sampling of The Washington Post, for example, featured no instances of women as peacebuilders, while also featuring only two instances of women in roles of political leadership. This included formal and informal roles as politicians, peacekeepers, activists, union members, protesters, and members of women's advocacy groups. Women manage to find ways to remain politically engaged even in contexts that are hostile to their civic contributions - yet they were snubbed and excluded from much of the journalism that I sampled in my research.

What are the consequences of such biased reporting? Many policymakers speculate that women may be sidelined in foreign policy contexts during the next four years. Given this possibility, making gender mainstreaming a reality is now more critical than ever. Moreover, the need to better integrate women in foreign policy and global politics remains essential to creating policy that is effective and inclusive. Journalism plays an essential role in the creation of that reality. Should we fail in this respect, we risk not only turning a blind eye to women's valuable insights, but also creating security policy that makes us all less safe.

PAINTING ARIZONA BLUE
A look at the Arizona Democratic Party and its role in Maricopa County’s 2016 election cycle
HAL DANESH
On November 8, Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump battled for control over the United States’ future. To the surprise of the nation, one of the places the battle was fought most fiercely was right here in Arizona. Hal Danesh, a former intern for the Arizona Democratic Party and member of the GATE Editorial Board, recently sat down with Arcelio Reybol, who was a Field Organizer of the Arizona Democratic Party during the election, to discuss the results and implications of the past election cycle and the Arizona Democratic Party’s role.

**What was your role in the Arizona Democratic Party (ADP)? Do you feel that you did a particularly good job in your role? Do you feel that you brought anything special or unique to your role?**

When I was with the Arizona Democratic Party during the 2016 election cycle, I was first a Democratic Fellow, and then I was promoted to a Field Organizer in early September. In regards to being a Field Organizer with the ADP, what I brought that was special was we branched out to precincts that were never before touched by the Arizona Democratic Party such as East and West Mesa as well as dominantly Native American demographic areas such as Fort McDowell and the Honda precinct. With that in mind, you can see that the Arizona Democratic Party, specifically with precincts under my leadership, that was something unique that we brought to the table.

**What do you think was different about this election cycle versus past election cycles for the ADP, and what has changed?**

Just like I stated, we branched out to demographic areas that have never been touched before by the Arizona Democratic Party. However, this was my first election cycle with the Arizona Democratic Party, and I have only been in Arizona for now what is about to be three and a half years due to my
### Maricopa County Presidential Election History

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Republican Candidate</th>
<th>Democratic Candidate</th>
<th>Other</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Registered Voters</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>679,455</td>
<td>504,849</td>
<td>10,657</td>
<td>1,194,961</td>
<td>1,552,421</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>746,448</td>
<td>602,166</td>
<td>22,756</td>
<td>1,371,370</td>
<td>1,730,886</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>749,885</td>
<td>602,288</td>
<td>28,714</td>
<td>1,380,887</td>
<td>1,817,832</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>747,361</td>
<td>702,907</td>
<td>86,475</td>
<td>1,536,743</td>
<td>2,117,906</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Data courtesy of the Maricopa County Recorder*

### Presidential Election Results

![Presidential Election Results Chart](chart.png)

- **Red** Republican Candidate
- **Blue** Democratic Candidate
predominant role as a student at Arizona State University. The conclusion that I’m coming to in Arizona right now, and through data from the Maricopa County Recorder’s office, is that you can see that, democratically, this state is changing. One thing that is huge is that, compared to previous election cycles, this election cycle had Arizona marked as a battleground state. So comparing that statement to previous election cycles, this election cycle really solidified the work that the Arizona Democratic Party has been doing and is doing currently.

Do you feel that Maricopa County itself has been going more blue? Why so?
To answer your first question, yes, Maricopa County is going more blue, the reason being that you have one of the largest public universities in the nation in Maricopa County. Just speaking, when you do have a high influx of individuals that are coming from out of state places such as California and New York and Chicago and other places in general, they are going to bring not only themselves here but also their ideas and political ideologies. These people are getting registered to vote, as you can also see in the percentages, and [these out of state college students] are voting in Arizona elections. To show the evidence of that, you can look at proposals that are being proposed in Arizona areas such as Prop 205, the legalization of marijuana. Now, it did not pass. However, it was on the ballot, and that within itself shows that not only are individuals changing because they are coming to college, but the locals in Maricopa County, because you have to get that petitioned to get that on the ballots, [the locals are] agreeing with such ideas as well. So, demographically, it’s changing, and that’s part of what’s causing Maricopa County to change to blue.

Do you feel that you and the strategies that the Arizona Democratic Party used had a role in this change?
Oh, completely! I can say personally, since June, because that’s when I started. Going out there, being able to speak with the people, whether it be on the light rail trains or going door to door, or just speaking in public areas, distributing flyers with Democratic candidates that have Democratic ideals that turn the state blue if they do and when they do get elected to their positions. For example, Isela Blanc on the local level [who ran for and won a seat in the Arizona House of Representatives], the Arizona Democratic Party had a huge role [in helping her get elected]. They were informing the public, engaging the public, and giving the public the opportunity to become involved with the
Maricopa County Presidential Election: by Percentage of Votes Won

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Percentage of Votes Won by Republican Candidate</th>
<th>Percentage of Votes Won by Democratic Candidate</th>
<th>Percentage of Votes Won by Third-Party Candidates</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>56.86%</td>
<td>42.25%</td>
<td>0.89%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>54.43%</td>
<td>43.91%</td>
<td>1.66%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>54.3%</td>
<td>43.62%</td>
<td>2.08%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>48.63%</td>
<td>45.74%</td>
<td>5.63%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

DATA COURTESY OF THE MARICOPA COUNTY RECORDER
democratic process itself.

Throughout the campaign, the Arizona Democratic Party has used rhetoric like “Paint Arizona Blue!” Many in the ADP offices were highly optimistic in the prospect of turning Arizona into a blue state. However, when polling time came, only two of our five Democratic candidates in Maricopa County won their elections, and Clinton did not come close to winning Arizona.

Do you feel that the Arizona Democratic Party underestimated their Republican opponents? As you stated, two of the five did win. I say that’s a huge victory when this state has been dominantly red for many decades. In regards to underestimating, no we did not. Every day, individuals were working more than the traditional eight hours of professional work. There’d be individuals going home from work at 3 AM, starting their day at 6 AM. We put in everything we had, and those efforts do show. Two of the five did win, and that shows huge progress in an Arizona, that is traditionally a red state. I think, looking at the specific candidates that did win, yes, you might say that still we didn’t get half our candidates in, but still, we got two of those five in, and, more importantly, we turned Arizona into a battleground state. And the whole nation was shocked by that. We were the most watched battleground state. Arizona has been on the watch since the beginning election months with Ann Kirkpatrick when MSNBC’s Rachel Maddow stated that John McCain is going against one of his toughest reelection campaigns in years, and Ann Kirkpatrick was the great embodiment of that. However, she did lose, but we did not underestimate... we were the ones that got underestimated, and even though three of the five candidates lost, two of the five candidates won.

Do you feel that the Arizona Democratic Party missed an opportunity to turn Arizona blue through poor management or leadership? Is there anything the Arizona Democratic Party could have done better this election cycle? Poor management and leadership, no, just because of the evidence showing that Arizona did become a battleground state. Now, there is always that asterisk to say “well there's always something that we could have done better.” But statistics talk. Voter turnout went up, Republican voting [votes for Republican candidates] went down, so the Arizona Democratic Party did do a great job. Leadership and management, just going off my experience, going from Arcelio Reybol the Fellow to Arcelio Reybol the Field Organizer, if you’re not ready, there are no days back. You, yourself, have to
## Maricopa County Senatorial Election History

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>McCain</th>
<th>Democratic Candidate</th>
<th>Other</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>917,527</td>
<td>216,124</td>
<td>31,147</td>
<td>1,164,798</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>599,068</td>
<td>319,012</td>
<td>64,741</td>
<td>982,821</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>842,425</td>
<td>602,635</td>
<td>79,724</td>
<td>1,524,784</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*DATA COURTESY OF THE MARICOPA COUNTY RECORDER*

### Votes Won in Elections for Senate

![Votes Won in Elections for Senate](image_url)

- **McCain**
- **Democratic Candidate**
- **Other**
train yourself. You, yourself, have to get yourself in that position where you can excel. Now, with being transferred and consistently changed to different precincts, my preparation for these precincts should have been better. However, there could have been areas where a more consistent base would have developed more production, because of the familiarity and the consistent contacts for individuals to contact that person within the similar precinct. That could have been done a little bit better, but I think it’s more individual things, the individual worker, the individual organizer, but in total I think the organization was there because Arizona was turned into a battleground state this year.

Do you have any final thoughts, anything to add, anything you wanted to say but did not get the chance to say?

Yes, I highly think that President Elect Trump, with his policies in regards to nationalism, falls under Mr. Dani Rodrik’s trilemma triangle. The model states that nations have two of three options: hyper-globalization, national sovereignty or the “Nation first” which President Elect Trump has clearly argued for, and democracy. Right now, with President Elect Trump, we have chosen democracy and national sovereignty, leaving hyper-globalization out of it. With President Elect Trump’s clear statements of “America First”, there has already been ripple effects within the globe, specifically with what you could call our competitor or “economic enemy”, China. China is taking on this opportunity. China has already beaten us with purchasing power. According to the Wall Street Journal, China has already conducted their visits to Latin America and already has an eleven page document stating they want to step in that globalization role and are already doing so within Latin America. Their number one investments are in Asia, but their number two is in Latin America, and because Donald Trump wants to step away from globalization, China is going to deepen their competition in the global sphere from our misstep of not staying in that leading role in globalization. I think that President Elect Trump needs to realize that his nationalist point of view needs to be broadened because when he speaks about competition with China and us getting done with our deals with China, it’s no longer just nation to nation deals, it’s the global picture, and China is, has been, and will be overtaking America in globalization and economic development.
### Percentage of Electorate won for Senatorial Election

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Percent McCain</th>
<th>Percent Democrat</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>78.77%</td>
<td>18.55%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>60.95%</td>
<td>32.46%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>55.25%</td>
<td>39.52%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

DATA COURTESY OF THE MARICOPA COUNTY RECORDER

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**Percentage of Electorate Won**

- **Percent McCain**
- **Percent Democrat**

![Percentage of Electorate Won Graph](image)
Introduction

U.S. President Barack Obama, in an interview with The Atlantic, caricatured the geopolitical competition between Saudi Arabia and Iran as no more than sectarian conflicts meant only to “settle scores.” The president proceeded to suggest that the best way to resolve tensions between Saudi Arabia and Iran was for the countries “to share the neighborhood” (Goldberg 2016). This characterization, utterly bereft of any strategic insight, cultural sensitivity, or diplomatic tact, is unfortunate and untrue. Governments and societies across the Middle East have collapsed. Extremism and radicalization is spreading with consequences for the world at large. Europe and the Middle East are facing the worst refugee crisis since the Second World War. The world has witnessed the worst genocides of the 21st Century. The regional balance of power is dangerously fluctuating while various states face imminent existential threats. There is so much more here than petty vendettas. In the chaos and crises that abound, Iran has been determined to play a shaping role. In doing so, Iran has presented itself as the greatest threat to the Gulf states since the collapse of the Soviet Union.

Iran has sought a sphere of influence, which includes substantial swathes of Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen, that has encircled the monarchies of the Gulf. Iran has pursued a model, in tune with the times, that eschews institutionalized arrangements providing for the establishment and acquiescence of satellite states in favor of auxiliary forces and non-state actors with little to no accountability to the governments of the countries in which they operate. Through unconventional means of subversion and intervention, Iran has further undermined the state system of the Middle East already weakened by the Iraq War and the Arab Spring. It has escalated and exacerbated sectarian tensions and divisions in the region. This has created fertile breeding ground for a new generation of religious radicals among Sunnis and Shiites alike with genocidal consequenc-
es in Iraq and Syria. Through disparate means yet with comparable consequences, Iran is engaged in an expansionist project in the Middle East, as was the Soviet Union in eastern Europe, by making nonsense of the alleged sovereignty of the aforementioned countries.

**Historical Background**

The Persians are heirs to the oldest surviving civilization in the Middle East. They are also heirs to one of the world’s oldest imperial traditions. Both Persian civilization and the Iranian imperial project reach back thousands of years. At one point or another, the Persian Empire extended its control and influence over much of the Middle East, the Caucasus, and Central Asia. Iran remains the most cohesive nation-state in a region of tribal monarchies and post-colonial partitions, and its cultural legacy is strongly visible in areas where the Persians once dominated.

Islam became the state religion upon the conquest of Iran by the Rashidun Caliphate in the 7th Century AD and has been the geographical center of the Shiite sect since the rise of the Safavid dynasty in the 16th Century. While remaining an avowedly imperialist regime, a program of secularism and modernization was implemented under the short-lived Pahlavi dynasty in the 20th Century. Its collapse during the 1979 Iranian Revolution, during which radical elements of the Shiite clergy, led by Ruhollah Khomeini, seized power and established the quasi-totalitarian clerical regime that rules contemporary Iran. While it signaled the end of the world’s last empire, it signaled not so much Iran’s renunciation of expansionist tendencies as its transmogrification in a radical and revolutionary context. In common with how many revolutions throughout history are portrayed, the grievances of the revolutionaries in Iran were presented as concerning democracy, human rights, and social justice. In common with how revolutions manifested themselves in practice in France and Russia, the Iranian Revolution consolidated around a leadership with little concern for such concepts and more focus on solidifying their newfound power, imposing ideological conformity through purges and indoctrination and seeking to export their revolutionary model to other countries. Upon seizing power, Khomeini pronounced that all existing forms of governance were null and void. Every ruler and potentate in Islamic world, except himself, “were tyrannical self-seeking rulers” who themselves had been creations of “imperialists” (Kissinger 2015). In a fiery and demagogic rhetoric utterly indistinguishable from that of Al-Qaeda and ISIS, Khomeini called for the overthrow of all Arab and Islamic regimes and awarded himself the title of “Leader of the Islamic Ummah and Oppressed People” (ibid).

In common with Osama bin Laden and other prominent figures in the contemporary jihadist movement, Ruhollah Khomeini was deeply influenced by the radical Egyptian writer Sayyid Qutb and wrote an admiring introduction to one of his works in which he described Qutb as a “lofty and great author” who demonstrated that “ultimately world government shall be in the hands of our school” (ibid). In stark contrast to the more ambiguous relationship that is perceived between the Gulf monarchies and what is suspected to be the more radical elements among the local clergy, the regime in Iran is avowedly supportive of ideology that advocates for the use of political violence for religious ends.

Aside from the evident similarities between the revolutionist ideology of the Iranian Revolution and the clerical fascism favored by Al-Qaeda and ISIS, world revolution has always held a central place in the regime’s propaganda. It is in a manner reminiscent of the transnational aspirations found in Jacobin and Bolshevik ideologies that propelled the French and Russian Revolutions. Just as the French and Russian revolutionaries had decided for themselves that they had discovered the will of history and proselytized their ideas by force in other coun-
tries, so too did Ruhollah Khomeini and his fellow travelers arrive at the same conclusion concerning the regime they had established. The Middle East has been afflicted by the consequences of the pretensions and presumptions of individuals like Ruhollah Khomeini in ways that go far beyond the shallow and contrived distinctions made between the Sunni and Shiite sects by Western scholars and analysts.

The Arab Spring returned these fundamentals of Iranian state ideology to the fore. Ali Khamenei, who succeeded Ruhollah Khomeini as “supreme leader” in Iran, described the uprisings that occurred throughout the Arab countries as a reaction against the “failure of communism and liberalism” and “bitter and horrifying experience of following the West in politics, behavior and lifestyle” (ibid). The collapse of regimes across the Middle East would herald the beginning of a world revolution that would just so happen to be aligned with the ideals of the Iranian Revolution. Khamenei further declared that Iran would be the “focal point of the awakening movement of nations” and claimed that “the slogans of Egyptians and Tunisians are being repeated in New York and California” (ibid). While this presumptuous narrative was put into question when the Iranian-aligned Assad regime in Syria was engulfed by the uprisings, it reveals the enduring principle of world revolution as a fundamental part of the clerical regime’s propaganda. The Arab Spring, for all the hopes that it would herald a new era for Arab liberalism and nationalism, has been followed by the greatest degree of Iranian interference and undue influence in Arab countries since the regime was founded. Perhaps the greatest impact of the Iranian Revolution and the Arab Spring on the Middle East has been, as Henry Kissinger predicted, the “combining of the Persian imperial tradition with contemporary Islamic fervor” (Kissinger 2006). The chaos of the uprisings, especially as observed in the onslaught of Al-Qaeda in Yemen and the ISIS in Iraq and Syria, has given the Iranian regime the scope and pretext to interfere, exploiting sectarian tensions and revolutionary ideology as a cover for strategic objectives.

**Syria**

When uprisings spread throughout the Middle East against governments that were for the most part aligned with or cooperative with the West, the narrative propagated by Iran’s Ali Khamenei that the Arab Spring was an “Islamic Awakening” inspired by its own revolution was compromised when mass demonstrations in Syria were immediately met with massive use of lethal force. Syria has been a long-standing ally of the revolutionist regime in Iran and has subordinately cooperated with Iran on a broad range of issues. Syria’s would-be president-for-life Bashar al-Assad had previously made various clumsy and stilted attempts at rapprochement with Israel and the West while demonstrating a certain degree of resentment over being treated as a client by Iran. While the rhetoric this involved may have embarrassed the regime in Iran, at no point did this involve a scaling down of the relationship between Iran and Syria. Syria continued to rely on Iran for developing defense technology that included ballistic missiles and nuclear reactors, and the military continued to look to Iran for training and guidance (Kagan, Majidyar, Pletka, & Sullivan 2012). Iran has been the primary sponsor of Shiite seminaries in Syria while Iranian investment in Syria has disproportionately outpaced any substantial or productive trade between the countries (Kagan, et al. 2012). Despite Assad’s failed attempts at detente with Israel and the West, the relationship between Syria and Iran up until the Arab Spring has been mostly in Iran’s favor. These circumstances have only been exacerbated beyond expectation by the Syrian civil war.

As if to further highlight the imbalances in the relationship between Iran and Syria, Iran has not simply provided conventional ground forc-
es in support of the Assad regime but has made organized and sponsored sundry militias with varying levels of brutality and extremism that have proved themselves more responsive to Iranian command than to the Assad regime (Fulton, Holliday, & Wyer 2013). Should the Assad regime finally collapse, under no circumstances should it be assumed that Iranian proxy militias will simply lose their relevance. Indeed, the final overthrow of Assad might simply presage a power vacuum that Iran would be all too willing to exploit to deepen its own presence and influence in the country. So extensive has been Iranian interference in Syria that former Syrian prime minister Riad Hijab declared that “Syria is occupied by the Iranian regime. The person who runs the country is not Bashar al-Assad but by [Iranian special forces commander] Qassem Suleimani” (Fulton, et al. 2013).

Iranian military intervention in Syria, supported by the Russian air force, has manifested itself as one of the greatest threats to world order since the end of the Cold War. The crude tactics and terrorist atrocities committed in support of the Assad regime, whether by local Syrian forces or the Iranian military units and Iranian-aligned militias fighting alongside them, has precipitated the most catastrophic refugee crisis the world has ever seen since the Second World War. The stability and unity of the European Union project has been threatened by divisions and disorganization in regards to the handling the refugee flows. Ultranationalist and neo-Nazi movements in Europe, once marginalized and ignored by mainstream political discourse, have risen on a tide of public anger concerning the crisis. The greatest tragedy of all to have arisen from the Syrian civil war has been the rise of Daesh or ISIL. Daesh has exploited sectarian divisions resulting from Iranian interference and Assad’s brutality by seizing significant swathes of territory in Syria that were then used as a base for expanding into Iraq where it proceeded to commit the largest genocide thus far of the 21st Century. The relationship between ISIL and Iran has since become a vicious circle wherein the atrocities and aggression of the other has only further reinforced their narratives and legitimized their crimes among their respective constituents and sympathizers.

**Iraq**

Iranian interference and influence in Syria has been geopolitically coterminous with its presence in Iraq. After the overthrow of Saddam Hussein in the Iraq War in 2003, Iran played a leading role in sponsoring and coordinating insurgent elements in Iraq against the US military occupation. During negotiations on status-of-forces agreements between the US and the new Iraqi government, Iranian agents made extensive use of propaganda in favor of encouraging public anger against Iraqi parliamentarians who supported a continued US presence and even attempted to bribe Iraqi negotiators into scuttling any agreement that provide any extensions to the agreements (Kagan, et. al. 2012). After the formal withdrawal of US troops from Iraq in 2011, Iran’s presence and influence in Iraq has increased exponentially. Iran exercised considerable pressure on its clients within Iraq to support the reelection of Nouri al-Maliki, the autocratic Iraqi prime minister who had openly aligned his country with Iran, declared support for the Assad regime in Syria, and institutionalized widespread discrimination and disenfranchisement of the Sunni Arab minority. This was, of course, followed by the near collapse of the reconstituted Iraqi military in face of not only the advances by ISIS, which were staged from Syria, but also from the staggering corruption and ineptitude that characterized the officer corps appointed by the Maliki government.

The resignation of Nouri al-Maliki under U.S. and local pressure and his replacement by Haider al-Abadi has not diminished Iranian influence. It has simply transmogrified into far more unconventional means. Former US military occupation official Douglas Ollivant argued recently that “Baghdad is not currently
under Tehran’s orbit - and that in fact the current government is pushing back against such an outcome. Washington is therefore deeply vested in the success of the Abadi government and should do whatever it can to help it” (Ollivant 2016). While Ollivant is correct when describing that the US has a significant stake in bolstering the authority of prime minister Haider al-Abadi against the various pro-Iranian factors in the country, the claim that Iraq is not within Iran’s sphere of influence overestimates the degree of authority the Abadi government has in Iraq. The idea that Iran’s control and influence in Iraq is no absolute or complete and is in direct competition with US influence does not render the tremendous imbalances in the Iran-Iraq relationship as demonstrated by continued Iranian interference irrelevant. The Abadi government has struggled to consolidate any meaningful degree of authority in Iraq. Figures sympathetic to the Iranian regime, such as former prime minister Nouri al-Maliki and radical cleric Muqtada al-Sadr, continue to exercise considerable influence in Iraqi politics and remain popular with their relatively wide constituencies. Most consequential for the Iraqi government has been the rise of the Hashid al-Shaabi, the militias organized and sponsored by the Iranian regime that played a substantial role in attacks on US troops and diplomats during the anti-American insurgency campaigns. These same militias have now been belatedly claimed to be an extension of the Iraqi state and have been used in resisting the advance of Daesh or ISIL in the north. They have nevertheless remained virtually unresponsive to Iraqi civilian leadership in most circumstances and are becoming themselves more heavily armed and better coordinated than Iraq’s own state security forces and armed services (Mardini 2015). This is best demonstrated by the impunity with which Hashid al-Shaabi has committed a series of sectarian atrocities and war crimes. The militias appear more like criminal enterprises or terrorist organizations than citizen-led counter-insurgency units employed by the Abadi government.

Aside from presenting themselves as heroic resistance to ISIL terrorists, the Hashid al-Shaabi engages in kidnappings, extortion, mob-style revenge killings, pillaging, looting, and even repeated acts of ethnic cleansing. The United Nations Human Rights Commission (2015) observed that the Hashid al-Shaabi “seem to operate with total impunity, leaving a trail of death and destruction in their wake” (4). Amnesty International (2014) reports that both Sunni Arabs and Assyrian Christians, as well as the occasional Shiite Turkmen, have been targeted for kidnappings while their families had been contacted by representatives of Hashid al-Shaabi to demand extravagant ransoms for their release. Once the families have paid ransoms, often by borrowing substantial sums, the hostages are murdered anyway. The victims are usually young men who provide the bulk of financial support to their families, and once the men are murdered, even after ransoms have been paid, these families descend into extreme poverty. One bereaved mother reported “I begged friends and acquaintances to lend me the ransom money to save my son, but after I paid they killed him and now I have no way to pay back the money I borrowed, as my son was the only one working in my family” (4). Another family reported being extorted by Hashid al-Shaabi and being told “we know you are Christian...and we don’t want to kill you but you must pay and don’t think you can avoid paying by moving; we know everything about your family and we’ll find you wherever you go and will kill you” (9). This family, who were Assyrian Christians rather than Sunni Arabs, became refugees fleeing Iraq not from ISIL but from Hashid al-Shaabi. Amnesty International further reported that Hashid al-Shaabi engaged in unabated spate of revenge killings ostensibly for the atrocities committed by ISIL. Whenever Hashid al-Shaabi has pushed ISIL
out of the villages and swathes of countrysides, it has regularly and indiscriminately targeted young men among the Sunni Arab tribes living there for supposedly collaborating with ISIL. Along with Sunni Arabs and Assyrian Christians, the Hashid al-Shaabi have targeted individuals who, while identifying with the Shiite sect, are not ethnic Arabs. One young man, a Shiite and Turkmen, reported to Human Rights Watch that he had been kidnapped by Hashid al-Shaabi militants and, once in their custody, “they were beating me randomly on my face, head, shoulders using water pipes and the butts of their weapons...they went to lunch and then came back and beat us for an hour and half... they kept me for nine days” (33). The basis for being suspected by Hashid al-Shaabi was that despite being a Shiite, he had been living peacefully with his Sunni neighbors for years and did not assent to the same degree of sectarian hatred espoused by the militias. He explained to the Human Rights Watch that “even though I am Shia, since I lived with Sunnis for so long... they thought I may be associated with [ISIL]” (34). In these regions where Hashid al-Shaabi has pushed out ISIL, “its residents, notably young men, tend to be suspected, wholesale, of support for groups like [ISIL] for the mere fact of living there, and as such have often been targeted by both government forces and Shia militias” (6).

Human Rights Watch (2015) reports that these same villages are regularly looted and destroyed by Hashid al-Shaabi once they seize control. Despite protests of by Iraqi prime minister Haider al-Abadi and radical cleric Muqtada al-Sadr, civilian properties in Sunni Arab and Assyrian Christian villages, including homes and farms, are painstakingly ransacked of all items of value and subsequently burned to the ground. Human Rights Watch further reports that the residents of these villages, already having had their homes and livelihoods destroyed, are themselves either driven from their area or captured, tortured, and often murdered by Hashid al-Shaabi. A resident of one of the villages reported to Human Rights Watch that his children and another relative of his had been captured and tortured by Hashid al-Shaabi, with his relative reporting on his return that “they kept the boys in an empty room’ After a short while I heard screaming and the sounds of the two boys being tortured in the room next to me” (32).

In March 2015, U.S. General Martin Dempsey, who was Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff at the time, reported to Congress that “we are watching carefully whether the militias...when they recapture lots terri-tory, whether they engage in acts of retribution and ethnic cleansing” (Weiss & Pregent 2015). The Hashid al-Shaabi have proceeded to do just that.

The Abadi government has utterly failed to hold the Hashid al-Shaabi accountable for their abuses and atrocities. The militias themselves are sponsored and indoctrinated by the Iranian regime through its special forces commander Qassem Suleimani. Through Suleimani, the Iranian regime has not only supported the Hashid al-Shaabi and its crimes but has also corrupted Iraq’s parliament and subsidized pro-Iranian and Shiite extremist propaganda in Iraqi newspapers and television stations (Filkins 2013). In terms familiar to those echoed by former Syrian prime minister Riad Hijab, former Iraqi diplomat and parliament member Mowaffak al-Rubaei, a Shiite himself, complained that Qassem Suleimani was “the most powerful man in Iraq without question...nothing gets done without him” (Chulov 2011). Former Iraqi prime minister Ayad Allawi, who is also a Shi-ite, concurred, observing that “I have yet to see one Shia political party not taking money from Qassem Suleimani” and claimed that ever since the US withdrawal “Iraq is a failed state now, an Iranian colony” (ibid).

Ollivant (2016) asserts that Iraq is “one of the few outposts of democratic institutions in the Middle East, and it is this democracy - not
any collection of kingdoms, emirates, or sultanates - that is the natural ally of the United States in region.” One may reasonably suggest that Qassem Suleimani and the Hashid al-Shaabi, through their wholesale robbery, ethnic cleansing, staggering corruption of Iraqi parliamentarians, and propaganda machine’s intrusion into Iraqi media has an inevitably corrosive effect on Iraqi’s democracy and compromises anything resembling free elections. Even should an Iraqi parliamentarian or civil servant acquire their office through fair and honest means within the context of democracy, being bribed or purchased openly and outright by Iranian agents severely compromises the representative character of Iraqi government. Further, while the Hashid al-Shaabi acts with total impunity in Iraq despite the disapproval of a smattering of Iraqi politicians and clerics, the Abadi government relies heavily on the clerical establishment in Iraq. Ramzy Mardini (2016) describes Iraq as a “soft theocracy” and argues that “although political decision-making may not be concentrated in the hands of clerics, there are direct and indirect consequences of attaining or exercising power without their tacit support.” One might observe the numerous fatwas issued by Iraq’s clerical establishment that just so happen to be followed by those few Iraqi government initiatives that actually succeed in parliament. One might also observe the numerous failed attempts by the Abadi government at reforms that would curb the influence of Iranian agents or the abuses and impunity of the Hashid al-Shaabi. Meanwhile, the seminaries run by Iraq’s clerical establishment are sponsored chiefly by the Iranian regime where young clerics are groomed to adopt the tenets of fundamentalist elements of the Shiite sects as well as the ideology espoused by Ruhollah Khomeini concerning the role of the clergy in the state (Kagan et al 2012).

**Lebanon**

Nowhere else besides Iraq is Iranian influence both as deepened and as disputed as it is in Lebanon. Similar circumstances face Lebanon at the moment including corruption and impetuosity in a nominal democracy that has made the state unable to confront or curb the influence of non-state actors and their state sponsors. What is different from the case of Iraq is that Lebanon has historically far more diverse and pluralistic than Iraq ever has been while at the same time has had a much longer experience with state authority being challenged or surpassed by local militias and foreign interference.

Since the Arab Spring, this is changing in that Lebanon is becoming less pluralistic as a society, and the challenges to state authority are increasing. Iran, through Hezbollah, have emerged as a dominant players in Lebanon where government and voter intimidation is now the rule rather than the exception. Hezbollah is one of Iran’s oldest proxies in the Middle East and the ideology, equipment, and funding of the group derives largely from Iran. Hezbollah has a declared allegiance to Iranian revolutionary leaders Ruhollah Khomeini and Ali Khomeini, whose advocacy of clerical fascism and world revolution the group has wholeheartedly adopted since its inception (Harik 2007). Armaments and other material is provided to Hezbollah by Iran via cargo planes traveling through Iraqi airspace and freight trucks traversing on Syrian roads to Bekaa Valley in Lebanon (Levitt 2007). Hezbollah has been estimated to receive over $100 million from Iran a year (ibid). With the Iran nuclear deal releasing an estimated $150 billion in frozen regime assets, it would appear to make little sense to dismiss any speculation or expectation that those amounts will not remain static, especially considering heightening tensions and spreading conflict across the region. Recruits have been flown to Iran where they receive training and indoctrination (ibid).

Christopher Hitchens once remarked that
Hezbollah “manages to be both the party of the downtrodden and the puppet of two of the area’s most retrograde dictatorships” (Hitchens 2015). A report by the Atlantic Council and the Brookings Institution (Byman & Saab 2014) states that in the aftermath of the Arab Spring, Hezbollah become Lebanon’s “most powerful and most complex actor” and that the group’s client relationship with the Iranian regime has endured and continues to receive “ideological and strategic guidance” from the Iranian regime.

Hezbollah has engaged in numerous assassinations and assassination attempts against Lebanese political figures perceived as being critical of Syrian or Iranian influence in the country. The most prominent of these was the assassination of prime minister Rafiq al-Hariri in 2005 in which Hezbollah has been implicated (Norton 2013). Al-Hariri, an Arab nationalist and Sunni Muslim, sought to make peace with Israel, had long-standing ties to the Saudi royal family, and worked tirelessly on developing infrastructure and public works (Blanford 2006). This would have presumably left less scope and less pretexts for Hezbollah to legitimize itself as a bulwark against foreign invasion and as a crucial provider of social welfare and public services. This in turn would have diminished Hezbollah’s political influence and by extension Iranian influence in Lebanon.

Aside from government intimidation, Hezbollah has played a role in the government itself since its successful campaign to represent eight constituencies in the 1992 parliamentary elections. It has had virtual veto power against the Lebanese government since 2008. Hezbollah played the primary role in the collapse of the government of Saad Hariri, the late Rafiq al-Hariri’s son, who himself was perceived as not sympathetic enough to the Iranian and Syrian regimes (Shadid 2011). Under pressure from Hezbollah, Lebanese foreign minister Gebran Bassil refused to condemn the clear violation of diplomatic immunity when the Saudi embas-

Yemen

After repeated obtuse and obstinate denials to the contrary by Western analysts and commentators, mounting evidence has accumulated of Iranian support for the 2014 coup d’état against the Yemeni government by Houthi militias that subsequently plunged the country into civil war. The Houthi militias, so-called because its leadership is concentrated within the al-Houthi clan. They are Shiite radicals that have loosely modeled themselves on Hezbollah and make frequent use of such familiar, boiler-plate slogans such as “death to America!” and “death to the Jews!” in their rallies and demonstrations (Mudallali 2014). U.N. officials have reported that Yemen has become a major destination and conduit for Iranian arms trafficking while the former U.S. ambassador to Yemen, Gerald Feierstein, stated explicitly that “we believe that [the Iranians] are providing military support and training to radical elements in diverse groups, especially the Houthis” (Terrill 2014). This was followed by reports from U.S. intelligence sources that Iran was the primary source of funding for the Houthi militias (Cloud 2011) and that Iranian special forces, led by Qassem Suleimani, have been engaged in an extensive operation to smuggle caches of weapons (Schmitt & Worth 2012) and even uniforms (Reuters 2013) into Yemen. An interception by the U.S. Navy and Yemeni Coast Guard of a ship coming from Iran, incongruously flying the Panamanian flag, led to the discovery of troves of Iranian-manufactured arms, ammunition, anti-aircraft missiles, rock-
ets, bombs, and bomb-making equipment (Terrill 2014). In response to being confronted with the evidence, Iran's UN Ambassador argued that “even if some of these items were made in Iran, this does not provide any evidence that Iran was involved in the shipment of arms to Yemen” (Terrill 2014). Finally, U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry stated bluntly that “obviously supplies have been coming from Iran. There are a number of flights every single week that have been flying in. Iran needs to recognise that the US is not going to stand by while the region is destabilised” (Kirkpatrick 2015).

What bears relevance now is that complementing Iran's material support for the Houthis is the strategic and ideological connections between Hezbollah and the Houthis. After asserting that the Houthis were in no way proxies of Iran or Hezbollah, Hezbollah commanders reported to the Financial Times “we exchange experience and ideology” and that “they trained with us in Iran, then we trained them here and in Yemen” (Solomon 2015). In response to the 2015 Saudi intervention in Yemen to contain and rollback the Houthis advance, the militants have made use of a modus operandi provided by Hezbollah which had been developed in the aftermath of the 2006 Israel intervention in Lebanon. Hezbollah’s so-called “resistance model” of guerrilla warfare depends on an organization’s ability to avoid air strikes from a neighboring country while making use of rocket artillery to destroy both military facilities and civilian property so as to either intimidate a government into scaling down its military campaign or provoke them into sending into ground forces and engage in a protracted and asymmetrical war of attrition.

While Saudi air strikes sought to destroy Houthi positions, Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah called for the Houthis to assault civilian targets in the Saudi villages and countryside of Najran, Jizan, and Asir close to the Yemeni border, stating “now is their chance” (Sobelman 2015). The Houthis proceeded to do just that and fired rockets into those very same villages. Assaults on nearby Saudi military facilities followed in which the Houthis made use of more sophisticated Iranian-manufactured missiles. The strategy has not thus far lured in Saudi ground forces and Saudi-backed government loyalists have continued to make piece-meal territorial advances in the containment and rollback of the Houthi militias. With the momentum of the Houthis having been threatened, one of Iran's top military officers threatened that Iran would expand its intervention in Yemen, stating that “the Islamic Republic ... feels its duty to help the people of Yemen in any way it can, and to any level necessary” (Ghobarri & Sharafedin 2016). Anticipating the opportunity for peace negotiations and informal talks with Yemeni and Saudi officials, senior Houthi leader Yousef al-Feshi complained of Iran’s “exploitation” of the Yemeni civil war and requested that Iran cease interfering in the conflict (Al-Arabiya 2016). These remarks should not be understood to indicate that the Houthis are not proxies of the Iranians. On the contrary, should seniors leaders among the Houthi ranks express frustration over being regarded as proxies by the Iranians, this would indicate that such a relationship has existed in the first place.

**Saudi Arabia and Iran**

In January 2016, Saudi Arabia announced execution of Nimr al-Nimr, a dissident Shiite cleric that had called for the overthrow of the Saudi royal family. Al-Nimr was almost immediately portrayed as a martyr in Iranian propaganda, and syrupy narratives in various Western media outlets depicted him as an icon of civil disobedience and human rights activism. This belies their reality. Nimr al-Nimr had long-standing ties to Hezbollah al-Hijaz (Braude 2016), a terrorist organization that remains operational in Saudi Arabia and borrows an Iranian-style revolutionist ideology from its namesake, Hezbollah in Lebanon. Founded by Shiite seminarians that studied the ideology of
Ruhollah Khomeini, the group espoused the Iranian concept of “guardianship of the Islamic jurists” wherein clerics would hold supreme power in a pseudo-republican regime (Matthiesen 2010).

Hezbollah al-Hijaz, was supplied and coordinated by the Iranian regime. Investigating Hezbollah al-Hijaz’s terrorist attacks within the kingdom, the CIA reported that Iran had supplied the group through “smuggled explosives into Saudi Arabia” and used them to conduct “sabotage and terrorism as an important option in [their] confrontation with the United States in the Persian Gulf” (Levitt 2015). The group was implicated or claimed responsibility for attacks on Saudi Aramco facilities, assassinations of Saudi diplomats and spies, and the 1996 bombing of the Khobar Towers. When Ali Khamenei was installed as Khomeini’s successor, the group declared allegiance to Khamenei and announced for the benefit of Iran, there would no difference between the Hezbollah offshoots “in Hijaz, Kuwait, Lebanon, or any other place” (Matthiesen 2010).

While Hezbollah al-Hijaz likely went into perpetual decline after the backlash resulting from the Khobar bombings, one should still consider that many of its former leaders and constituents, as well as the grievances they exploit, have remained. In 2009, Nimr al-Nimr called for an Iranian-style revolution in Saudi Arabia that would see the secession of the Eastern Province and its reconstitution as a state governed by a Shiite version of clerical fascism. He explicitly used Khomeini’s term “wilayat al-Faqih” or “guardianship of the Islamic jurists” in describing the ideological roots of his program for revolution in which radical clerics would seize control (Alnogaidan 2016). Building on the support from what was left of Hezbollah al-Hijaz, al-Nimr sought out disaffected and alienated young men and encouraged them to seize weapons, commit arson against public property, and commit the occasional murder (ibid). While it is not certain just how al-Nimr figured he would be able to orchestrate a grandiose repeat of Iran’s 1979 revolution by encouraging young men to become petty criminals, he was eventually detained by Saudi authorities. Far from proceeding to systematically persecute his family, they were sent to a comfortable exile in the US where his wife’s hospital visits and his sons’ enrollment at university were all subsidized by the Saudi state (ibid).

His execution was followed by a response in Iran where mobs ransacked and set fire to the Saudi embassy, Ali Khamenei warned of “divine vengeance” on the kingdom, and Iran’s Revolutionary Guard threatened “tough revenge in the not-too-distant future” that would “trigger the collapse” of Saudi Arabia (Bozorgmehr & Kerr 2016). Saudi Arabia and its Gulf allies severed diplomatic relations with Iran in response.

**Conclusion**

All of this should place into context the rising tensions between revolutionist Iran and the Gulf Arab states. Iran has been seeking and building a sphere of influence centered on Tehran that has penetrated into Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen. It has done so using the various phases enumerated by Hoffman in his model of the ‘spectrum of conflict,’ shifting from one mode to another depending on the countries and circumstances involved. Certainly, Iran’s presence in all of these countries is constantly in flux, contested by rival social and political forces that are both local and external and at no point is total and absolute. It would be absurd to suggest that this in itself makes Iranian interference negligible or irrelevant. To suggest or argue that Iran has not been engaged in carving out a sphere of influence in the Middle East that encircles the Gulf monarchies on this basis fails to appreciate and understand the nuances of power in the emerging post-Westphalian world. Expansionism by either an imperialist or revolutionist power no longer relies on the use of massive interventions and extended occupations by conventional forces as was the norm.
in eastern Europe in its client-patron relationship with the Soviet Union. Nor do great powers or aspiring regional powers need demand and acquire unquestioning ideological orthodoxy or unconditional policy alignments from those entities they wish to utilize as proxies or clients as the Soviet Union aspired and attempted to do either in eastern Europe and or in the developing world. Further, prior to the emergence of the Soviet Union and the partitions of the Cold War, spheres of influences in the age of colonialism thrived on the complexities and ambiguities of control and influence and rarely relied on so rigid arrangements as materialized in the Cold War. Yet it is almost invariably an ahistorical and absolutist model that critics and skeptics will most likely refer to as a standard of measure, either implicitly or explicitly, by which to dismiss or diminish claims that Iran has engaged in developing a sphere of influence in the Middle East.

What is necessary is that those proxies and clients fulfill the primary strategic and ideological objectives of their patrons in a clearly subordinate role. That is precisely what Iran has sought to accomplish. Iran’s sphere of influence has been achieved through complexity and ambiguity rather than in spite of it because of the flexibilities inherent in such fluctuating and imperfect circumstances. It would have bemused British and Russian strategists navigating the geopolitical dilemmas of the Great Game in the 19th Century that their flexible and ambiguous use of interchanging proxies and clients did not constitute control and influence by one or the other empire. Ultimately, further disputes over whether or not Iran has established a network of proxies and a sphere of influence in the Middle East may end up being more semantic than substantive.

Having understood this, it bears mentioning that Iranian grand strategy and Saudi Arabia’s plans to counter it are primarily strategic rather than sectarian. As Cambanis (2015) argues, “Sunni-Shiite enmity is the not the best explanation for today’s regional war. This is a naked struggle for power.” Regional rivalries in the post-Ottoman Middle East have occurred on a similar scope before, albeit with less destructive consequences, in tensions between the Gulf states and the regimes of Gamal Abdel Nasser in Egypt, Muammar Gaddafi in Libya, and Saddam Hussein in Iraq. Those involved were all Arabs and nominal Sunnis and yet those convenient labels and identifiers were never invoked as at no point did it highlight the contrived differences between the parties. The real substantive differences between the two were in that one side was composed of postcolonial monarchies aligned with the West and the others revolutionary regimes aligned with the Soviet Union. There are similar yet not identical circumstances surrounding the Saudi-Iran rivalry. Saudi Arabia and its Gulf allies remain monarchies aligned with the West and in particular with the United States and the United Kingdom.

Iran and its allies and clients are revolutionists that are aligned with Russia. In these multi-layered rivalries, ideology and sectarian rhetoric certainly plays a role but at no point is it the fundamental cause. There are no more grounds for arguing that disputes over the succession to the Rashidun caliphate are fundamentally the root cause of the Saudi-Iran rivalry any more than there are to argue that diverging social attitudes towards sexuality are the root cause of contemporary Russo-American rivalry.

What can be observed instead is classic balance-of-power politics being conducted with contemporary means. The balance-of-power politics are manifested in the geopolitical competition between Iran and Saudi Arabia and their respective allies and proxies. The contemporary means are manifested in the exploitation of failed states and the engagement of and with non-state actors in their stead. We would do well here to return to Clausewitz’s judgment that “very few of the new manifestations in war
can be ascribed to new inventions or new departures in ideas. They result mainly from the transformation of society and new social conditions” (On War, Ch. 30). The ‘state of nature’ described by Hobbes, where he observes that “during the time men live without a common power to keep them all in awe, they are in that condition which is called warre; and such a warre as is of every man against every man,” has force and salience (Leviathan, Ch. 13). Herein lies a fundamental maxim from which to understand the relationship between classical ends and contemporary means. It is through Clausewitz and Hobbes that we must understand Hoffman’s spectrum of conflict. The decisions and events that have been described in this paper have occurred within the context of the failure of governments and the collapse of borders with no single actor yet maintaining a sustainable monopoly on force. These same actors, despite the novel circumstances, have not wavered in the pursuit of the perennial strategic objective: power.

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German and Japanese Motivations for War Brutality

The Erosion of Ethics by Ordinary People During World War II

Janna Tobin

“This essay explores the motivations of ordinary German and Japanese soldiers to commit acts of brutality on enemy combatants and civilians alike during World War II. Both German and Japanese soldiers shared a common motivation fueled by their indoctrination of a racial hierarchy that their respective states culturally and politically constructed. Yet, due to the priorities and structures of these respective governments, the groups of soldiers also experienced differing motivations fueled by the construction and prioritization of different cultures. For the Japanese, a stressed importance on military culture and the ethical and nationalistic codes that followed offered reasoning to brutalize others. On the contrary, for the Germans, a carefully constructed political culture comprised of propaganda and legislation that supported anti-Semitism and racism provided motivation for these soldiers to commit crimes against humanity. This essay also discusses the different primary sources, such as wiretaps and diary entries, and how they offer differing insight into displays of “autotelic violence” (purposeless violence at the benefit of the perpetrator), indoctrination, and doubt. Ultimately, this ethical disregard was exhibited by ordinary combatants, not solely elites, and these horrid actions can serve as a warning to what future war may entail.”

“Ultimately, this ethical disregard was exhibited by ordinary combatants, not solely elites, and these horrid actions can serve as a warning to what future war may entail.”
After the first World War, citizens, soldiers, and political figures alike thought they had witnessed the epitome of human sadism and war brutality. Yet, less than twenty years later, World War II immediately countered this notion. World War II was a transnational conflict that epitomized total war, which directly engaged civilians in the conflict. The world experienced a crisis of modernity in the twentieth century due to events such as the senseless rape and slaughter of thousands of Chinese during the Rape of Nanjing, the systematic murder of 6 million Jews during the Holocaust, and everyday actions of German and Japanese soldiers that seemed to counter the progress of humanity. While both German and Japanese soldiers were similarly motivated by varying forms of racial ideology and hierarchy that led to the brutal treatment of civilians and opposing soldiers alike, Japanese soldiers experienced greater motivations from military culture, while German soldiers were fueled more heavily by political culture.

There is no doubt that racism was a leading motivation for soldiers to commit war crimes against civilians and enemy soldiers. German soldiers’ racism was fueled primarily by propaganda issued by the Third Reich that caused Germans to fight the war differently on the Western and Eastern fronts. German soldiers were more apt to commend the bravery and persistence of French, British, and American soldiers, and regarded them as enemies but closer culturally—thus more sophisticated. Propaganda reinforced the opposite ideas in regards to Eastern Europe, as primarily Soviet soldiers were portrayed as the enemy, and thus these soldiers experienced more brutality because Germans thought of them as a lesser race. One German soldier described that “you wouldn’t believe how fantastically the devils fought” and that “[w]hen we capture any of them, we make an end to them at once,” showing the starkly different view Germans held of Russian soldiers. Another German soldier in a British prisoner-of-war camp expressed how he felt the Russians were treated too humanely, stating that “one must simply smash their legs with a club…now I think it’s quite right”. Yet, this mentality was not existent in regards to the Western front, and this caused soldiers not to commit as many needless acts of violence against these enemy soldiers. Contrary to the view of succumbing to the Soviets, “it was not considered dishonorable to surrender to the Allies.” Hitler’s idea of Lebensraum, or more “living space” for the German people, further affirms this idea as the expansion of Germany was directed toward areas that Hitler consid-
“The Japanese 20th century desire to join the Western powers naturally produced an admirable quality to the condemnation and mistrust of the Americans.”

rer German (such as Austria). Eastern nations that he deemed racially inferior were thus justifiable in conquering for the greater good of his fabricated Aryan race. Similarly, propaganda fueled German racist ideology towards the Jews by portraying them as subhuman infiltrations into Aryan society, helping to legitimize actions of abuse against this group. Soldiers became accustomed to robbing, randomly arresting, and maliciously executing Jews in established ghettos and concentration camps. Even soldiers who were struck by the harshness of these actions would often describe their abhorrence, but end their narrative with “even though they were Jews,” reaffirming the stark prevalence of this established anti-Semitism. Lieutenant General Heinrich Kittel, observed via wiretaps of the United States, though seemingly abhorred by the crimes committed against this group, admitted he felt that “[i]f one were to destroy all the Jews of the world simultaneously there wouldn’t remain a single accuser.” Thus, the soldier was truly bothered by the reputation Germany was sure to receive in response to committing genocide, and not the genocide itself, still connecting Germany’s problems to the Jews and confirming the superiority complex, as Jewish genocide became a nuisance, and racial hierarchy established by the Nazi regime motivated soldiers towards acts of unimaginable brutality.

Similarly, racism towards the Chinese increased Japanese soldiers’ willingness to participate in brutality during World War II. When recounting the experiences of Japanese soldiers, there is a general transition from pity to hardened brutality that is fostered by the nature of war and ultimately racist thought indoctrination. Former Japanese peasant farmers were often the most empathetic towards the Chinese, but even this empathy was ultimately skewed as it was accompanied by a superior attitude of fighting, what they felt was, a defeated nation. The White Man’s Burden argument, adapted from Kipling’s poem during the era of imperialism, suggests it is the duty of the white man to “civilize” people of states that they view as primitive. Japanese soldiers saw justification for events such as the Manchurian incident, which was a staged precursor conflict for invasion by the Japanese, and the subsequent creation of Manchukuo. These were sparked by the idea that the Chinese were “backwards” and Japan was meant to civilize the people under this Pan-Asianism ideal (the symbolic unity of all Asian states and their people) with Japan as the leader. The raping of Chinese women, bayoneting of civilians, and ransacking of towns became the norm as Japanese soldiers equated their negatively skewed views of their enemy soldiers to the innocent civilians and thus enacted violence against them as well. One soldier epitomized these normalized conceptions by stating that “I am all the more confident of our superiority…it will be easy for [the Imperial army] to overcome the animal-like prowess, the physical robustness, and the existential deep-rootedness of the Chinese Masses.” By associating the Chinese with subhuman qualities and a supposed backwards culture that has impeded the progress of their nation, it eliminated the moral dilemma that should come with war, and instead soldiers acted with blank
checks to commit any crime without question.

It is also important to consider the similar juxtaposition between German tactics in Russia versus in the West, as this was also present between the war in China and the war in the Pacific for the Japanese. The Japanese 20th century desire to join the Western powers naturally produced an admirable quality to the condemnation and mistrust of the Americans. In Japanese propaganda Americans were typically portrayed as demons, showing that they were viewed as malicious but still powerful on the world stage. This can be connected back to Japanese resentment of the Washington Treaty system, in which Japan developed a victimized narrative after the treaties limited Japanese naval power (a 5:5:3 ratio comparative with Britain and the United States), established cooperative imperialism in Southeastern Asia, and affirmed the Open Door Policy in China. Compromise was always considered between Japan and the Western powers, while the same could not be said between Japan and China. For example, the Meiji Constitution, adopted after the signing of various Washington treaties that were deemed unfair by the Japanese, was a product of external pressures by the West that meant to demonstrate that Japan was an imperial power with a rational system of laws and protections. On the contrary, Japan intentionally provoked incidents with China, such as the Manchurian incident, for economic and political gain. Thus, while still feeling the ABCD encirclement (embargoes against Japan engaged by America, Britain, China, and the Dutch that fostered resentment towards the West), Japan had a degree of respect for American might, technology, and culture that wasn't present in thought towards the Chinese due to racist thought indoctrination.

Yet, while Japanese soldiers experienced a similar motivation to German soldiers based upon racist dispositions, there was a much greater emphasis on military culture that normalized and placed pressure on individuals to forgo moral standards during the war on China and in the Pacific. The idea that surrendering was unthinkable and disrespectful to the emperor and the nation caused soldiers to brutally lash out, specifically in the War in the Pacific, even when it was clear Japan had lost. This principle was not only verbally reinforced but physically documented, as military doctrines such as "The Japanese Field Service Code," required soldiers to commit suicide before surrendering and emphasized the concept of bushido (way of the warrior) that dictated the ethical code for Japanese soldiers. Kamikaze pilots are an example of the brutal extremes of these policies in action, as the pilots were used as last ditch efforts to cause as much destruction as possi-
Military culture was still prevalent in Nazi Germany, but political culture was the ultimate driving force of motivation for soldier brutality.

In the Pacific. Thus, supposed and actual punishment was a rationale for committing crimes, and the Japanese military complex was so strict that “[o]fficers who made mistakes in reciting the code would see themselves as having committed a shameful act and commit ritual suicide.” The importance of being a member of the Imperial Army was emphasized by the need to serve the emperor, the figurehead of the empire and military alike, and was often a reason for committing violent acts even if the perpetrator expressed discontent. A member of Unit 731, the infamous biological and chemical warfare experimentation unit, described how he and his fellow soldiers would complete as many “strict disposals” (murders of innocent Chinese civilians) as they could because it was an honor to serve the emperor and it would improve their ranking in the Imperial Army. Soldiers thus experienced peer pressure from other soldiers that made them more willing to commit heinous crimes, such as decapitating civilians, because it was normalized by these principles and other soldiers’ applications of it.

The importance of the military infected civilian life as well, as newly drafted soldiers were often given send-off parties by friends and relatives who were proud of the soldier’s future dedication to the empire. Thus, the military complex became an important aspect of Japanese life in the 20th century, and the undying dedication of soldiers to fulfill these expectations led to unprecedented brutality during the war.

Military culture was still prevalent in Nazi Germany, but political culture was the ultimate driving force of motivation for soldier brutality. While Japanese soldiers experienced a harsh militaristic code of conduct, there is no record of punishment of a Nazi soldier who refused to shoot someone or commit another atrocity, even though soldiers expressed that “[t]hey would have had to do it, if they had ordered [us] to.” Nazi propaganda was a primary tool in political dissemination and unity, not only meant to keep citizens in line with Nazi ideology, but also direct how soldiers fought the war. For example, the portrayal of the Red Army as beastly, amoral men made “[t]he urge to fight until the bitter end…even stronger on the Eastern front” because soldiers did not want to become prisoners-of-war at the hands of Russian soldiers. Thus, because surrender was scarce due to fear, soldiers were willing to do whatever it took to eliminate the Red Army because of the strongly portrayed negative image that was presented to them in the form of propaganda. While it is important to recognize that not all propaganda was thoroughly believed, as soldiers were able to make a mockery of Hitler and his cabinet’s flaws that contrasted the supposed Aryan ideal, they subconsciously picked out information to believe. At home, the stripping of rights and subsequent annihilation of groups such as gypsies, disabled civilians, and Jews became a part of political doctrine, through policies such as the T4 program that designed for the systematic murder of the disabled and the Nuremberg laws which stripped Jews of numerous rights, including German citizenship. The innate harshness of organized events, such as book burnings and political speeches also allowed this brutality to burgeon into normalcy, and the prevalence of these ideals in the political system made soldiers truly believe these ideals and thus translate the harshness that politics had against Communists and Jews onto the battlefield.
“World War II exhibited some of the most horrendous instances of human disregard for ethics and morality that the world had ever seen[...]”

When comparing the motivations of German and Japanese soldiers in committing heinous crimes against enemies and civilians alike, it is important to recognize the different primary sources that are available for each side as they offer varying degrees of intimacy in regards to the thoughts and experiences of soldiers. Wiretaps of German POWs under American surveillance are a unique source in that they present completely unfiltered conversations between soldiers in which they share experiences. These wiretaps perfectly display the phenomenon of “autotelic violence,” or violence committed for no larger purpose but for the sole benefit of the perpetrator and how the political system normalized this brutality. On the other hand, the primary sources from Japanese soldiers are primarily diaries and interviews. Thus, there is more room for censorship based on who the letter is intended for, as a soldier may relay the crimes he committed during battle differently to a father versus a younger sibling. Also, in interviews, soldiers may be prone to tell a narrative that they believe is true, but can be skewed simply by time and possibly a lack of resolution or acceptance of the past. Yet, this is not to say that there is not valuable information in diaries and interviews regarding the motivations of Japanese soldiers, as clear prejudices against the Chinese and willingness to murder civilians in the name of the emperor are clearly present. Instead, other aspects, such as the period of acculturation to murder may be slightly blurred.

World War II exhibited some of the most horrendous instances of human disregard for ethics and morality that the world had ever seen, and the terrifying aspect is that this brutality was not simply exhibited by leaders and elites, but by ordinary German and Japanese soldiers as well. German and Japanese soldiers were motivated by racist conceptions and sought to justify the horrid treatment of primarily the Jews and Chinese, respectively. Yet, the nature of each of these societies produced other motivations for brutality as well. Japan focused heavily on establishing a strict militaristic society based on a code of serving the emperor that was not to be broken, while Germany functioned as an efficient political machine of ideological unity. Ultimately, regardless of these motivations, ordinary men were able to commit crimes against humanity that are abhorred today, nearly 75 years later, and hopefully these false justifications for brutality serve as a warning to present and future governments that ethics are essential in maintaining our humanity.
References


THE ISRAELI TARGETED KILLING POLICY

A MULTIDIMENSIONAL STUDY OF EFFICACY

by Yonit Upart

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Abstract
Conflict in Israel is ongoing and permeates through international borders by stimulating discussion world-wide. Whether or not diplomatic relations have been successful, counterterrorism policies have developed and been adopted by other countries like the United States. The targeting and elimination of militant terrorist figures is one of the policies that have stirred much controversy. The effectiveness of it, however, continues to be in question. This research paper aims to take a rounded approach to analyze the efficacy of targeted killings for national security. I employ a three-dimensional method by measuring the influence of targeted killings on violence, public opinion, and economy. Statistical analysis is conducted through Paired-Sample T-tests with data derived from the period of the al-Aqsa Intifada. There is suggestive evidence that targeted killings have a significant negative effect on Palestinian violence.

The continuing conflict in Israel is a popular topic among not only academics and politicians, but the general public as well. Since the mid-20th century, numerous attempts have been made by both Israelis and Palestinians to resolve the conflict and create peace, although none truly prevailed in creating lasting order. Diplomatic help was even supplemented by international involvement through shuttle diplomacy. Up until the al-Aqsa Intifada, peacemaking attempts were numerous; one of the most notable and advanced of these mediation efforts was the Camp David Accords in 1978. Since the Intifada, attempts continued and are ongoing to this day, including the most recent 2013-2014 diplomatic conversations involving American Secretary of State John Kerry. It is astounding that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict remains violent after such a long period of war, international involvement, and academic research. The issue of indivisible territory, Israel’s hardline policies, and the continuing violence by state and non-state actors are a few components and catalysts of the conflict. Although diplomatic channels remain open, violence continues sporadically and in periods of war.

Israel’s targeted killing policy originated during the time of the al-Aqsa Intifada, also known as the Second Intifada, and is a form of fatal violence that continues to be implemented and supported legally. While useful in theory, its utility and efficacy is barely evidenced through conclusive empirical research. Targeted killing, as employed by the Israeli military, “is the intentional slaying of a specific individual or group of individuals undertaken with explicit governmental approval” (David, p. 2). Those employing the targeted killing policy argue that its effectiveness lies in deterring, disrupting, and incapacitating the enemy, thus securing the state. The other side of the argument states that Israeli military force in response to
Palestinian terrorist activity can be thought to bring about more retaliatory violence via the backlash effect, thus decreasing the likelihood of peace through this continuous cycle, radicalizing the population, hence increasing the complexity of the conflict through added violence (Seale 2008). Much discussion exists on the merits and morality of the targeted killing policy that originated within the Israeli environment (Blum, Heymann). Opinions vary and are fueled by how one-sided and finite the resulting actions of this policy are; everyone from parliament members to Palestinian committee presidents are voicing their opinions for and against targeted killing (Barghouthi; Richburg). An examination of the legality of the targeted killing policy by the Israeli High Court in 2006 justifies enemy combatants, civilian and militant, as being legitimate objects of attack under the international law of armed conflict (Rogers, McGoldrick, p. 782). In addition to this, the High Court created a set of conditions that must be met in order to justify a targeted killing according to customary international law, Israeli domestic law, and human rights law. They argued that by taking part in terrorist attacks against the state and its people, enemy combatants relinquished their right to protection from attack.

Proponents of including the targeted killing policy as a part of counterterror operations focus on the positive outcomes rather than the negative consequences pertaining to national security. Opponents of this policy focus more on the undemocratic angle the policy seems to take; that is, the administration’s omnipotent decision to kill is considered unethical. In the past, the policy was mostly challenged through petitions and judicial hearings to the High Court of Justice by parliament members and human rights organizations. Most petitions were dismissed while others awaited the High Court’s decision on the legality of targeted killing. On the legal dimension, it was decided that each case is circumstantial and must be examined retrospectively to determine legality; the High Court did not change the policy except to alter the verbiage to make it more clear (Hajjar). With the legal dimension reaching an impasse, an empirical argument based on objective evidence can round out what we know about this policy in terms of effectiveness. Existing research has had narrow focus and has led to contrasting results. In order to understand whether targeting and eliminating enemies of the state is justified through policy, it is imperative that an empirical research design focuses on the policy’s influence on national security. This utilitarian approach can create strong evidence, decreasing controversy, and has the power to influence policy and international relations. Justifying the policy for targeted killings empirically could explain the motive for violence in the Israeli perspective and clarify the argument by understanding how national security goals are being met by employing this policy. This could open and stimulate discussion that could eventually lead to progress in the peace process and create precedent for other countries currently implementing this policy.
Effectiveness of Targeted Killings

Israel’s actions against terrorism are grounded in its responsibility to maintain national security to its citizenry in an environment of constant strife. The definition of national security ranges from general understanding, to evolved theory, to government-designated definitions. In order to have a clear understanding I have chosen common elements of national security from various sources. The basic-human-needs perspective maintains that security includes elements of economic, personal, and political protection, as the UN Development program traditionally defined (Newman, p. 243). A more modern interpretation of security by the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs defines elements of security to include not only military protection, but also economic measures like employment, personal measures against physical violence, crime, and terrorism, and political measures against repression (“National Security versus Global Security”). In measuring whether Israel is effectively achieving its intended desire to maintain national security, this research will test and analyze these basic elements of security as they are influenced by targeted killing. The previously mentioned conditions outlined by the Israeli Supreme Court that must be met for a legal targeted killing are as follows: “1. The evidence of participation had to be ‘well based’, 2. Attacks should not be carried out if less harmful means can be employed. The court had in mind the alternative of arrest, investigation and trial, 3. After such an operation a thorough investigation of the identification of the target and the circumstances of the attack upon the target is to be carried out, 4. Any collateral harm must withstand the proportionality test.” (Rogers, McGoldrick, p. 782) These conditions act as legal safeguards to ensure that the killing is not arbitrary and perfunctory but meaningful and intentional.

The assumed relationship and the basis for using targeted killings as counterterrorism efforts is that the killing of a terrorist leader will sustain national security by deterring, disrupting, or incapacitating the terrorist organization. There is also speculation that it possibly creates a backlash effect and negatively influences the security of the acting state by provoking retaliation. Hafez and Hatfield continued this discussion in a study that tested whether violence levels of suicide bombings, non-suicide bombings, rocket attacks, sporadic shootings, and organized armed infiltrations were affected by targeted killings. They found no apparent relationship between the variables but their design included foiled attacks and measured violence in many different forms, not necessarily lethal attacks (Hafez, Hatfield, p. 21). Further research on targeted killings that focuses on the leadership decapitation of terrorist organizations shows that it increases the chance of war termination and the probability of government victory while reducing the intensity of military violence and the frequency of insurgency attacks in the long term (Johnston, p. 69). This research creates evidence for the use of targeted killings and supports the deterrence, disruption, and incapacitation theory. A similarity between these research designs is not distin-
guishing between successful and foiled killings in the independent variable; this is something that I would like to acknowledge because I consider it significant and influential on the environment. Johnston admits that it is possible that his results are biased by consequences of failed attacks. A failed attack might incite a very powerful reaction and have an undesired effect on national security. Additionally, differences in the research designs exist in short-term versus long-term analysis and the status of targeted militants. The conflicting results may be influenced by the dissimilar timeline analysis and the variable esteem of the killed militant. Additional research by Jaeger and Paserman supports the deterrence and incapacitation theory by concluding that there is a short-term deterrence effect after a targeted killing on realized Palestinian violence (Jaeger, Paserman, p. 339).

My paper utilizes a different design and aims to understand similar effects of Israeli targeted killings during the al-Aqsa Intifada, which occurred from September 28, 2000 through February 8th, 2005. It analyzes whether the desired effects are achieved by breaking down three dimensions of national security and measuring their immediate level after a targeted killing.

Reduction of terrorist activity against the state of Israel would satisfy the personal safety goal in maintaining national security. The counterterror measure of targeted killing ultimately aims to reduce violence against Israeli citizens, especially fatalities. Based on Johnston's research I hypothesize that there is a negative relationship between the targeted killing of a militant terrorist figure and the frequency of subsequent violence; the event of a targeted killing will decrease subsequent violence (H1). I speculate that successful, or not foiled, targeted killings strongly influence the violence levels enacted by militant terrorists if violence is measured by Israeli fatalities. Although Hatfield and Hafez's hypotheses were not confirmed, I argue that the deterrence, disruption and incapacitation theories stand on strong merit and could be supported with a different design. When a militant terrorist leader is eliminated, such an offensive operation on the organization could intimidate the group into going on the defensive and choosing to lay low in order to minimize further loss. In addition to this, a loss of leadership could disrupt its mission and cause it to temporarily cease operations while it recovers and reorganizes. A targeted killing can distract the community by causing it to be emotionally affected and react to the loss by taking time to mourn. Finally, by denying militant groups the human resources that they need in their leadership, targeted killings can incapacitate organizations through loss of technical skill, communication channels, and organizational infrastructure. The deterrence, disruption, and incapacitation effects would decrease terrorist activity in the short-term, leading to a decrease in violence.

Citizens' political freedom is a prominent aspect in the push for maintaining national security. Attitudes in regards to their political confidence and voice can be measured in popular opinions of the administration's decisions, policies, and actions in regards to combatting terrorism. My next hypothesis is that there is a
positive relationship between the targeted killing of a militant terrorist figure and the public's confidence and optimism for peace—the event of a targeted killing will increase the public's confidence (H2). Public confidence should increase when known enemies of the state who are reputed to have killed innocent civilians are prevented from inflicting further harm. Optimism in the peace process and faith in administrative decisions to promote physical safety are crucial in maintaining a strong and secure democratic state because popular opinion is often referenced by those in power.

Economic stability is crucial in maintaining a viable and secure state. Citizens react to political indicators when making financial decisions and are influenced by their perception of the strength of the government in achieving national security. Research done by Noam and Asaf Zussman shows that there is a positive relationship between targeted killings and stock market performance. They claim that the elimination of a high-ranked militant terrorist leader increases faith in investors because investors consider it effective in combatting terrorism while killing low-ranking militants does not have any effect (A. Zussman, N. Zussman, p. 204). I hypothesize that there is a positive relationship between the targeted killing of a militant terrorist and Israel’s economic environment; the event of a targeted killing will increase economic activity (H3). Based on the Zussmans’ findings, I argue that the act of a known targeted killing will influence the Israeli economy, however I would like to explore targeted killings regardless of organizational rank.

I believe that if these killings are exposed to the media, research will yield similar results. Rational investors would increase spending based on optimism in government and military leadership, the future of the country, and political strength after the targeted killing of a known terrorist.

These hypotheses rely on the intended consequence for which Israel employs the policy in deterring, disrupting, or incapacitating the terrorist organization and therefore preventing violence, increasing political optimism and faith and promoting economic activity. The first hypothesis (H1) analyzes the personal safety of citizens and rests on the reasonable conclusion that the state aims to decrease immediate violence from Palestinian insurgents, thus the targeted killing is aiming to disorganize and eliminate terrorists that can harm Israeli citizens. H2 focuses on citizens’ opinions of their own political security—the policy should cause them to be optimistic about future peace and increase faith in the administration’s decisions. H3 looks to the economic security of Israeli citizens by understanding investors’ trading decisions in relation to their perspective on the value of future profits as influenced by a successful targeted killing.

**Data and Method**

In order to analyze the effects of the policy of targeted killing on the three continuous dependent variables that measure violence, public opinion, and economy I run a Paired-Sample T-test. In order to capture the influence of a targeted killing on the three variables, the outcome
is compared with a baseline measure, which is the average value of the same variables before the event took place. The T-test compares the average value of two datasets, helping us understand the difference in the averages before and after the event of a targeted killing. The before and after reference points that are chosen are exactly a week prior and a week after the targeted killing took place. The week-long timeline is not meaningful and is chosen to optimize measurement of such variables in regards to militant terrorist mobilization and economic fluctuations. The variable for public opinion, in this case optimism in regards to the possibility of peace, is less frequently measured. The data that is available is taken monthly, thus the before and after measurement occurs at the end of the month prior to the targeted killing and at the end of the month after the killing.

As discussed earlier, the three dimensions I chose to measure the effectiveness of national security are the elements of personal physical safety, political safety, and economic safety. To further empirically analyze the influence of Israel’s targeted killing policy I selected specific variables that appropriately reflect and measure the environment: violence, public opinion, and economy. The following sections describe how each variable is measured.

**Targeted Killings**

Since the policy for targeted killings originated and was heavily employed during the Second Intifada that occurred from September 28, 2000 to February 8, 2005, I have chosen to set my timeframe within those parameters. The Second Intifada was a significant time of turmoil in Israel and its surrounding territories, and therefore it is heavily studied and there is sufficient data available. However, since this period of time is characterized by frequent violence that is both sporadic and retaliatory, it is possible that the variables measured in this research are influenced by other unobserved factors. The frequency of Israeli targeted killings during the al-Aqsa Intifada can be visualized in Graph 1 below.

**Targeted Killings during the al-Aqsa Intifada**

Graph 1 – Sample of American-Israeli Cooperative Enterprise data and B’Tselem – The Israeli Information Center for Human Rights in Occupied Territories data used in research (can be found in Appendix A) Relevant targeted killing data is first based on a list created by the American-Israeli Cooperative Enterprise with reliable public resources and cross-referenced with targeted killing data from B’Tselem – The Israeli Information Center for Human Rights in Occupied Territories (Israel Counter-Terrorism: Targeted Killings of Terrorists; “Palestinians Who Were the Object of a Targeted Killing in the Occupied Territories, before Operation “Cast Lead”). I start with the compiled list first
in order to ensure that the targeted killings are exposed to the media and are of significant terrorist figures. I then confirm their accuracy with the B’Tselem data. Further selection from this list follows a set of qualifications:

1. Confirmed media activity
2. No civilian fatalities as a result of targeted killing operation
3. Not politically involved militants
4. Death, not injury

These qualifications act as filters to control the data for relevance. Confirmed media activity is established through archived accounts of immediate local and international newspaper reporting of the event. It provides the medium in which Israeli society and Palestinian militants observe and react to a targeted killing. It creates the opportunity for citizens to change public opinion, act on the country’s financial environment, and allow for Palestinian’s to react to the killing of a militant terrorist leader.

Additionally, research has indicated that collateral damage in the form of non-combatant fatalities in targeted killing operations cause an unintended result by negatively influencing popular opinion and therefore creating bias in economic decisions (A. Zussman, N. Zussman, p. 201). For this reason targeted killings with such fatalities are not included in the dataset as to not distract from the intended hypothesis. Similarly, research indicates that the killing of politically involved leaders of terrorist organizations creates a negative, undesired effect in data thus such people are omitted from the independent variable dataset (A. Zussman, N. Zussman, p. 204). Asaf and Noam Zussman speculate that the loss of political leaders and innocent bystanders cause the population to feel as though targeted killing is a counterproductive and ineffective policy. Lastly, it is crucial to distinguish successful targeted killing operations; the impact of death rather than injury is more powerful in influencing the public’s reaction and the terrorist organizations’ decision to mobilize or cease activity. There are many instances that an attempted targeted killing operation failed, causing publicity and ridicule, or simply injured the target, leading them to escape and continue operations –or even increase violent activity against the attacking state. This list of qualifications was used to filter in only the most valid targeted killing data and left the dataset with a sample of 49 from a total population of 70 during that timeframe. The final population data used for targeted killing analysis can be referenced in Appendix A and details names, affiliations, and method of killing.

**Violence**

In order to reflect actual, realized, violence on Israeli society I use fatality data in this timeline from B’Tselem –The Israeli Information Center for Human Rights in Occupied Territories (“Palestinians Who Were the Object of a Targeted Killing in the Occupied Territories, before Operation “Cast Lead”). This data reflects Israeli civilian and security forces killed on Israeli land, not in the West Bank or Gaza, by the hands of Palestinians the accumulated week before and after the killing. This dataset is specifically exclusive to fatalities occurring
within Israeli land because it emphasizes the assumed security of citizens’ homeland, where they should presumably be safe from war and conflict and confident in their safety. After a targeted killing the change in frequency of fatalities occurring in citizens’ designated legal and rightful living area should also significantly impact their lives enough to influence our other dependent variables (popular opinion and economy). Israeli security forces are included in this dataset because the compulsory military service policy in Israel dictates that any person, off-duty or not, that is enlisted or on reserve is considered a soldier. Excluding this data would cause our data to exclude soldiers that are killed while at home not participating in military-sponsored activities. In order to increase validity and influence on dependent variables, it is important to include this data in the dataset. Fatalities on the day of the killing are considered prior to the event in the data, as they are reasonably assumed to have been premeditated and carried out without public knowledge of the killing. Thus, fatalities cannot be a result of a violent attack motivated by the independent variable. The data from the week prior to the killing acts as a control measure while the data from the week after is used to further test Hafez and Hatfield’s research hypotheses of insurgent backlash and deterrence effects. It is important to note other factors that may influence the number of Israeli fatalities, such as diplomacy efforts like the emerging Road Map for Peace, Israeli military offensive operations immobilizing militants, defensive and heightened security measures such as road and border closures, and random acts of unaffiliated Jihadi violence.

**Public Opinion**

In regards to assessing changing political attitudes by way of public opinion, an ideal measure would be to analyze ongoing government approval ratings after a targeted killing. In the absence of such data at this time, I will use an interpretation of the public’s optimism for peace in the future as a proxy. I measure this through the first question of the Israeli Peace Index survey. The Israeli Peace Index is a continuous study aimed at understanding opinion patterns regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and is conducted on the representative sample of 600 Israeli adult men and women (The Peace Index). The first question asks, “Do you believe or do not believe in the coming years [that] there will be peace between Israel and the Arabs?” (The Peace Index Archive). The rationale for this question is to understand the public’s optimism for a peaceful future; this is an indicator of whether they believe that the administration is making the correct policy and strategic decisions during the conflict. A successful and public targeted killing of a violent enemy of the state should restore faith in the population’s physical security and increase support for the administration. Therefore, indirectly, citizens’ optimism for the future reflects their support for the government and its actions. Question #1 was changed March 2003 to “What is your position on the agreement signed between Israel and the PLO in Oslo (memorandum of understanding)?” (The Peace Index Archive). Although it is unclear why the ques-
tion was changed, the Memorandum of Understanding, also known as the Declaration of Principles, was signed in September 1993 and took a step towards Israeli-Palestinian cooperation by making an arrangement for immediate Palestinian self-rule in the occupied territories (“Israel-Palestinian Negotiations”). The public’s support for such an agreement a decade later is indicative whether their faith currently lies in upheld agreements in this changing environment. Results from both questions are equally valid and admissible because the data that is reflected relevantly measures Israeli Jewish citizens’ confidence in the future peace of the country. The data gathered from this question is the combined percentage of Jewish respondents that responded:

Sure that there will be peace/Definitely support [the memorandum]
Think that there will be peace/Support [the memorandum]

Data that was not included were Arab responses and Jewish neutral and negative responses. Neutral and negative responses were omitted because they do not measure the public’s confidence—the intended dependent factor. Arab respondents were not included because past research indicates that their reaction to targeted killings is different and more nuanced, thus distracting the analysis. Since the survey is taken monthly, the intended objective of measuring the public’s immediate reaction to the killing could have a weaker association than weekly data. This is dependent on how close the targeted killing occurred to the survey date.

Economy

An accurate measure of Israeli economy is the Tel Aviv Stock Exchange, specifically the share prices of the top 25 market capitalization companies in Israel—the TA-25. It is active every day, thus this research maximizes validity by recording the closing index value exactly a week prior and after the targeted killing in the dataset in order to align with the fatality timeframe and measure whether the targeted killing policy influences the economy positively or negatively. Like the fatality variable, the closing index value a week prior acts as a baseline data point, while the value a week after intends to reflect the presumed effects of a targeted killing. As applicable to the fatality dataset, since some targeted killings in the dataset occur in close vicinity to each other, the subsequent measurements of dependent variables a week before and after could repeat. Other explanations that could influence the stock market results include natural fluctuations in the market, the influences of domestic politics, and supply, demand, and international trade effects during wartime. In addition to this, since the stock exchange is not open on Shabbat and the weekends some of the dates for the data are not exactly a week before and after, they are off by 1-2 days—these dates are referenced in Appendix B.

\[1\]Research has indicated that public reaction to violent terrorist attacks against the state of Israel differ between the Jewish and Arab population within the state (Romano, Dmitri, Asaf Zussman, and Noam Zussman).
Analysis

Violence

The Paired Sample Statistics in Figure 1 provide insight as to the difference in average fatalities the accumulated week before and after a targeted killing. In order to obtain a clear understanding of the relationship between targeted killings and fatalities in the first hypothesis I start by looking at the mean values in the Paired Samples Statistics. My hypothesis states that the event of a targeted killing will decrease subsequent fatalities in the state of Israel, thus the mean value should decrease in ‘Fat-Post’ when compared to ‘Fat-Pre’. Figure 1 indicates that the accumulated week before a targeted killing the average number of fatalities is 2.9 while the accumulated week after a targeted killing the average number decreases to 1.2. The direction of the difference in means is behaving as expected; after the treatment of a targeted killing the average number of fatalities is lower. Additionally, the Paired-Sample T-test for H1 in Figure 2 helps show that the relationship between the accumulated fatalities of Israeli citizens and security personnel the week before and after a targeted killing is significant and non-random.

The Paired-Samples T-test in Figure 4 shows that this test offers no significance at the p-value of 0.201. This means that there is no difference in average values between the samples, the results are based on random chance, and that we accept the null-hypothesis in rejecting H2. When honing in on the mean in the Paired Differences section of Figure 4, we see that the dif-

Figure 1

Figure 2

Figure 3
ference between averages is 0.70% with a standard deviation of almost 4%. This explains the low significance value in the dependent variable when treated by the targeted killing.

Economy

The economic safety aspect of national security is the last to be tested with the average Tel-Aviv 25 Index closing prices the accumulated week prior and after the treatment of a targeted killing. A look at the mean of each sample in Figure 5 clearly shows us that there is hardly a difference in the average closing prices in each sample while there is still a large standard deviation within them. Although the average two-point increase between 'TA25-Pre' and 'TA25-Post' is small, it does follow the expected directionality of the third hypothesis which states that a targeted killing will stimulate the Israeli economy by increasing stock market closing prices. It seems as though the significance does not meet the expected two-tailed standard with a high p-value of 0.406 as seen in Figure 6. This signifies that there is no difference between the average values in the paired samples, therefore it is based on random chance and there is no relationship between the closing prices of the TA-25 Index and the event of a targeted killing. H3 is inconclusive and the null-hypothesis is accepted.

### Conclusion

Israel has been the first country to overtly employ and defend a policy of targeted killing in the war against terror since the al-Aqsa Intifada and has since become a model for countries like the United States in the fight to preserve national security (Blum, Heymann). This policy continues to be challenged and to gain controversy because effectiveness remains questioned. Using empirical data from the Second Intifada, I take an expansive, three-dimensional approach to measure whether the policy is effective in terms of maintaining national security. The national security that a state strives for includes three separate dimensions: personal physical safety, political safety, and economic safety. The statistical comparisons provided indicate a potentially strong link between targeted killings and decreased subsequent violence, but does not show a significant effect on public opinion and economy. The intent of examining this policy holistically caused me to draw three hypotheses, however only the first is confirmed; I recommend utilizing an alternate research design to further explore the relationships of H2 and H3.

Some limitations of using secondary data that exist in this research design could be eliminated in order to improve upon it. The time period for which this research is chosen,
during the Second Intifada, is one in which Israel performed consistent and consecutive targeted killings. However, it is also a period of frequent violence by unaffiliated violent Palestinians as well as terrorists and is characterized by random events like suicide bombings, civilian-led bombings, as well as organized terrorist activities. In addition to this, the Israeli Defense Forces’ continuous reactive measures like road and border closures, offensive raids, and heightened defensive measures could have also impeded terrorist activity that would alter the fatality figures and make the secondary data used in this research less valid. The fatality data during this time could also have been affected by political progress and diplomatic relations between Palestinian Authorities.

In addition to the possible bias in fatality data, lack of available research on the mobilization time of Palestinian terrorist factions has led me to choose an arbitrary week-long reference point for data measurement before and after a targeted killing. When evaluating the secondary data, the week cut-off mark excluded many significant fatalities from the dataset that could have been associated with a decrease in terrorist activity after a targeted killing. Including these figures could have made the data more valid and the results more convincing. Another flaw in the data is the temporally misaligned popular opinion variable of the Israeli Peace Index survey question, which was only taken at the beginning of each month. Although the Israeli Peace Index survey was the only consistent and relevant popular opinion survey taken during this time frame, it is possible that the effect on popular opinion could have inaccurately reflected immediate reactions to a specific targeted killing since they occurred sporadically during any month—some may have been better reflected in the survey data than others. The available data for the timeframe I chose was very limited, therefore it loosely reflected political faith. Additionally, the week-long cut-off further proved problematic for the economic data reflected by the TA-25 stock market closing index prices because it was sometimes unavailable; the stock market was not open on weekends, and therefore some of the data that was used was from a day or two prior. Finally, it is possible that the closing index prices reflected natural economic fluctuations from domestic politics, supply and demand, and international investment, especially during war time.

In order to better understand the holistic effectiveness of the targeted killing policy I recommend strengthening the research design by minimizing the previously outlined limitations. To increase external validity and decrease irrelevant fatality measures in our data I would recommend focusing the timeline away from periods of continuous conflict; this can be done by choosing a different timeframe in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict other than an Intifada or moving on to a different context involving other states. It is crucial that the timeframe not be representative of an especially idiosyncratic environment so that it could be applied to other states and conflicts. Although conflict behavior does not occur in controlled environments like labs, and there will always be external influencers, a carefully-chosen setting will ensure a
sustainable relevancy in this field of study. In addition to this change to the research design, I recommend to alter the week-long before and after reference point for data comparison. Further research on organizational mobilization could shed light on the most indicative point in time to assess data for a valid result; the reference point should accurately reflect the amount of time it takes for an organization to regroup and retaliate if it is able. There is further opportunity to strengthen the dependent variable of public opinion in measuring political faith in the administration by finding more accurate and precise survey data. If a different timeframe is chosen it is possible to find a public opinion survey more reflective of political attitudes towards government and taken with a greater frequency as to align with the rest of the variables.

Evaluation of these results leads me to conclude that only confirmation of the first hypothesis satisfies a dimension of national security. The targeted killing approach of counterterrorism efforts appears to decrease civilian fatalities within domestic land. The other elements of national security, political and economic security, are not confirmed through this research method, although there is reason to believe that an alternate design could provide more conclusive evidence. A utilitarian argument for the targeted killing policy can be made with the first hypothesis alone based on the value of human lives. It seems as though this research further supports Johnston’s findings that the targeted killing of a militant terrorist leader is effective in deterring or disrupting an organization in inflicting violence onto the state. Although the originally intended comprehensive analysis of the three elements of national security is not satisfied for holistic effectiveness to be confirmed, these results can aid administrations, policy-makers, and militaries in making decisions based on the benefits and risks associated with a targeted killing. If a state’s targeted killing policy was to be challenged by the international community, the state could defend it through the utilitarian perspective of maintaining the personal safety element of national security.

Appendix A – Targeted Killing Population Data

1. October 21, 2004 Adnan Al-Ghoul; Imad al-Baas
   a. Hamas
   b. Israeli airstrike in Gaza

2. October 6, 2004 Bashir Dabash; Zarees Alareer
   a. Islamic Jihad -Heads of Military Arm in Gaza
   b. IDF missile strike.

3. September 27, 2004 Ali al-Shaer;
   a. Popular Resistance Committees -Senior Member
   b. Israeli helicopter fired a missile at a car east of the city of Khan Younis.

4. September 21, 2004 Nabil al-Saedi; Rabah
5. September 20, 2004 Khaled Abu Shamiyeh
   a. Hamas
   b. Israeli airstrike in Gaza

6. September 13, 2004 Mahmud Abu Khalifa
   a. Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade
      -Commander in Jenin
   b. Killed along with two of his assistants in an Israeli airstrike.

7. July 29, 2004 Amr Abu Suta; Zaki Abu Rakha
   a. Ahmed Abu Reish Brigade
   b. A helicopter strike

8. July 22, 2004 Hazem Rahim
   a. Islamic Jihad -Local Commander
      (Seized the body parts of Israeli soldiers killed when a roadside bomb destroyed their armored personnel carrier on May 11)
   b. Helicopter strike

9. June 26, 2004 Nayef Abu Sharkh; Fatah Tanzim
   a. Nablus Commander
   b. IDF ambush in Nablus

10. June 14, 2004 Khalil Marshud
    a. Al-Aksa Martyrs Brigade
    b. IAF helicopter gunship strike

11. May 5, 2004 Imad Mohammed Janajra
    a. Hamas Senior Commander, West Bank
    b. Shot by Israeli security forces as he approached the village of Taluza, outside Nablus.

12. April 17, 2004 Abdel Aziz Rantisi
    a. Hamas Organizational Leader
    b. IAF helicopter-fired missiles slammed into his car not far from his home in central Gaza City

13. March 16, 2004 Nidal Salfiti
    a. Islamic Jihad
    b. Israeli missile strike in Gaza.

14. March 3, 2004 Tarad Jimali; Ibrahim Diri; Omar Hassan
    a. Hamas Senior Members
    b. Israeli missile strike

15. February 28, 2004 Mahmoud Juda; Aiyman Dahduh; Amin Dahduh
    a. Islamic Jihad Senior Commanders
    b. Israeli helicopter gunships killed three fugitives riding in a car in Gaza.

16. December 25, 2003 Mustafa Sabah
    a. Hamas Bomb maker (Mastermind of three attacks against Merkava tanks in the Gaza Strip
    b. Was killed in an IAF strike in Gaza City

17. September 1, 2003 Khader Houssre
    a. Hamas
    b. Air Force helicopters fired four
missiles at a car in the Gaza Strip

18. August 30, 2003 Abdullah Akel; Farid Mayet
   a. Hamas
   b. Air Force helicopters fired four missiles at a van in the Gaza Strip

19. August 28, 2003 Hamdi Khalaq
   a. Hamas -Military Wing Member
   b. Air Force helicopter fired a missile

20. August 24, 2003 Walid el Hams; Ahmed Eshtwi; Ahmed Abu Halala; Muhammad Abu Lubda
   a. Hamas Activists
   b. IDF helicopter strike.

   a. Hamas Activist
   b. Missiles fired from an air force helicopter.

22. April 29, 2003 Nidal Salameh
   a. Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine -Local Military Leader
   b. Four missiles fired from an air force helicopter at a car in the southern Gaza Strip

23. April 9, 2003 Mahmoud Zatma
   a. Islamic Jihad -Senior Commander, Bomb Maker
   b. Missile fired by an IAF Apache helicopter hit the car he was driving in Gaza City.

24. March 8, 2003 Ibrahim Makdme
   a. Hamas Second-in-Command of Military Wing
   b. Israeli attack helicopters fired missiles

25. December 23, 2002 Shaman Hassan Subah; Mustafa Kash
   a. Hamas
   b. Killed in an IDF ambush near Jenin.

   a. Al-Aksa Martyrs Brigade Local Leader; Hamas Local Leader
   b. Killed in an Israeli airstrike in the Jenin refugee camp.

27. October 29, 2002 Assim Sawafta
   a. Hamas Military Wing Ring Leader
   b. Killed by an undercover army unit.

   a. Hamas West Bank Commander
   b. Shot and killed by IDF soldiers of the Kfir Brigade

29. July 4, 2002 Jihad Amerin
   a. Al-Aksa Martyrs Brigade Leader in the Gaza Strip
   b. Killed in a car blast.

30. June 30, 2002 Muhaned Taher; Imad Draoza
   a. Hamas Master Bomber; Deputy Bomb Commander (Taher, known as “Engineer 4,” was responsible for supplying the the bombs used in a
June 2002 Jerusalem bus bombing that killed 19 and wounded 70 and in the June 2001 Tel Aviv disco attack that killed 21.)
b. Killed in a raid in Nablus by IDF naval commandos.

31. April 22, 2002 Marwan Zaloum; Samir Abu Rajoub
   a. Fatah Tanzim -Hebron Militia Leader; Senior Aide, Member of Force 17. (Zaloum was believed to be responsible for numerous shooting attacks and bombings, including the March 2001 killing of Shalhevet Pass, a 10-month-old infant, in a sniper attack in Hebron.)
b. Israeli helicopter strike.

32. March 6, 2002 Abdel Rahman Ghadal
   a. Hamas
   b. Missile attack on his home in Gaza City.

33. March 5, 2002 Mohand Said Muniyer Diriya, Fawzi Hamdi Mustafa Maher, Oman Kaidan
   a. Force 17, Tanzim
   b. The IDF targeted the three in Ramallah.

34. January 25, 2002 Adli Hamdan
   a. Hamas -Head of Military Wing (Hamdan was believed to have been involved in an attack that left four soldiers IDF soldiers dead, and in the manufacture of mortars.)
b. Killed in Khan Yunis when an IAF Apache helicopter fired two missiles at his Car.

35. January 22, 2002 Ankilled Jasser Samaro, Nassim Abu Rus, Yousef Suraj, Karim Masarja
   a. Hamas Regional Bomb Preparation Experts
   b. IDF special operations unit killed the men who were on a list of wanted terrorists Israel submitted on to the Palestinian Authority.

36. January 14, 2002 Raed Mahmoud Karmi
   a. Tanzim Tulkarm Commander
   b. Killed when his car blew up. Israel had asked the PA to imprison Karmi, but Arafat refused. Terrorists under his command murdered at least six Israelis.

37. Nov. 23, 2001 Mahmoud Abu Hanoud,Ayman Hashaykah
   a. Hamas Senior Commander in West Bank, Deputy to Senior Commander
   b. IAF helicopter fired missiles at the car. Hanoud was convicted by the Palestinian Authority of leading an unauthorized military cell and sentenced to a 12-year jail term. He was later released.

38. Nov. 12, 2001 Mohammed Hassan Reihan
   a. Hamas -Senior Leader
   b. Killed in a gunfight with Israeli forces at his West Bank home in
Tel. Reihan was wanted for the 1998 killing of two Israelis.

39. Nov. 1, 2001 Yasser Atsida, Fahmi Abu Aisha
   a. Hamas Military Wing Members
   b. Helicopter gunships attack a car in the West Bank city of Tulkarm.

40. October 31, 2001 Jamil Jaddala
   a. Hamas
   b. Killed by Israeli security forces in Hebron in a helicopter missile attack.

41. October 18, 2001 Atif Abayyat
   a. Fatah Military Wing Member
   b. Killed along with two other people when a car exploded in Beit Sahour. This followed the assassination of Israeli Cabinet Minister Rechavam Zeevi by the PFLP.

42. October 16, 2001 Iyad al Akhras
   a. Hamas
   b. Killed when an explosive went off inside his house.

43. October 15, 2001 Ahmad Marshoud
   a. Hamas
   b. Killed in a car bomb explosion in the West Bank town of Nablus.

44. October 14, 2001 Abed Rahman Hamad
   a. Hamas -Military Wing Senior Member
   b. Shot by snipers at his home in Qalqilya.

45. August 27, 2001 Abu Ali Mustafa
   a. PFLP Commander
   b. Israeli helicopter fired a missile through the window of his Ramallah office.

46. August 20, 2001 Imad Abu Sneneh
   a. Tanzim -Local Commander
   b. Shot in Hebron

47. February 13, 2001 Massoud Ayyad
   a. Force 17 Lieutenant Colonel
   b. Killed when Israeli helicopter gunships fired four missiles into his car as he drove on the outskirts of the Jabaliya refugee camp in the Gaza Strip.

48. December 10, 2001 Mahmoud Mugrabi
   a. Fatah
   b. Killed by IDF soldiers while reportedly planting a roadside bomb near Bethlehem. Mugrabi’s name was on a list of ten reputed terrorists that the IDF had targeted for killing.

49. Nov. 23, 2000 Ibrahim Abdel Karim Bani
   a. Hamas
   b. Killed when a bomb exploded in the car he was driving. Israeli sources insinuated Bani was transporting explosives that detonated prematurely, but PA security forces arrested Bani’s cousin, who reportedly confessed to tipping off
Appendix B – Alternate Dates for TA-25 Index Closing Prices

2/6/01 to 2/5/01
10/8/01 to 10/7/01
10/9/01 to 10/7/01
11/16/01 to 11/15/01
11/30/01 to 11/29/01
1/18/02 to 1/17/02
2/1/02 to 1/31/02
6/29/02 to 6/27/02
3/1/03 to 2/27/03
3/15/03 to 3/13/03
4/16/03 to 4/15/03
5/6/03 to 5/5/03
6/14/03 to 6/12/03
6/28/03 to 6/26/03
8/23/03 to 8/21/03
9/6/03 to 9/4/03
1/1/04 to 12/31/03
2/21/04 to 2/19/04
3/7/04 to 3/4/04
2/27/04 to 2/26/04
4/10/04 to 4/8/04
4/24/04 to 4/22/04
4/30/04 to 4/29/04
9/30/04 to 9/28/04

Works Cited


Community Development and Refugee Self-Sufficiency During Resettlement: 
The Case Of Phoenix, Arizona

Robert Davis

This article discusses community development within the context of refugee resettlement. Refugees face many hardships leading up to and during resettlement, which can make adjusting to life in the US quite challenging. Successful resettlement is dependent on the provision of services by resettlement agencies that empower refugees to achieve long-term self-sufficiency. It is also contingent upon a host community’s receptiveness towards refugee populations, which is challenging in states like Arizona where anti-immigrant sentiments are prevalent. Drawing on interviews with resettlement agencies based in Phoenix, Arizona, this study examines the conditions of refugee resettlement and self-sufficiency. The findings indicate that basic needs are met; however, the agencies are not always adequately equipped to facilitate long-term self-sufficiency for those refugees that struggle to adjust. Furthermore, the host community is generally unaware of the presence of refugee populations, but those who are aware tend to be receptive or indifferent. This study indicates that federal mandates by which resettlement agencies abide inhibit the development of long-term refugee self-sufficiency thus there is a need for community alliances to be fostered.

A ll too often, people are forced to flee their homes and nations as they fall victim to the life-threatening and destructive hands of war, political instability, ethnic conflict, and religious intolerance. In response, the United States along with just a handful of other countries are committed to welcoming a select number of individuals of ‘special humanitarian concern’ on an annual basis, offering them the opportunity to start life afresh through resettlement (RCUSA, 2014). According to Pumariega & Rothe (2005), the path of migration to the US, for many, is often “filled with risks and stressors that are unique to immigrants, both prior and after their arrival” (p.583). According to the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR), of the 14.4 million refugees around the world, less than one percent are granted permanent resettlement (2016). The majority reside in refugee camps indefinitely, and some eventually return to their home countries if improved conditions permit it.

The refugee experience is often categorized into three stages: the preflight stage, the flight stage, and the resettlement stage (Kirmayer, 2011; Pumariega & Rothe, 2005; Birman & Basu, 2005). The first two stages tend to be characterized by high exposure to trauma as a result of life-threatening circumstances. Of the small fraction of refugees granted permanent resettlement, these individuals face a new set of unique challenges. They must continue to cope with the residual effects of trauma as well as overcome post-migration stressors during resettlement. Kirmayer’s (2011) research suggests that the major stressors during resettlement include social and economic strain, social alienation, discrimination, and status loss (p.962). These stressors are largely impacted by the receptiveness of the host community and how refugees see themselves within their new environments. Successful integration illustrates the overall resilience and vast potential for refugees to be contributing members of society once more.
It is important to point out that although research concerning the mental health of refugees is essential, this particular body of literature is also criticized for contributing to the victimization of refugees and their portrayal as being needy, mentally unstable, or vulnerable. Rather, some scholars argue that the connection between trauma and self-sufficiency is not an explanatory factor (Fazel, 2005). Marlowe’s (2009) work, for instance, stresses the importance of distinguishing between the ordinary and extra-ordinary stories of refugees so as to “[develop] a more sophisticated understanding of how people have responded to trauma beyond the ‘event-worthy’ underpinnings of forced migration” (p.183). Marlowe further explains that: “A predominant focus upon the extra-ordinary [e.g., traumatic experiences of refugees] privileges stories of forced migration over the ordinary [ones] that arguably speak more to who people claiming refugee status are and what they inherently value… [Thus, there is reason] to further elevate the importance of the ordinary, which can provide a helpful framework for viewing resettling refugees as peers in social life, capable of meaningful contributions to family, community, and society” (p.189-190).

Conceptualizing refugees predominantly within the context of trauma and mental instability influences the perceptions the host community may have of refugees as well as the ways refugees regard themselves. From an institutional perspective, the resettlement practices adopted by refugee resettlement agencies, whether they focus on the extra-ordinary or the ordinary, have a profound impact on refugees and the host community. Successful refugee resettlement can enable and empower refugees to attain long-term self-sufficiency. Successful settlement can also foster a sense of receptiveness amongst the host population which in turn contributes to refugees’ long-term self-sufficiency. Drawing on interviews with refugee resettlement agencies in Phoenix, Arizona this study examines the conditions of refugee resettlement and self-sufficiency.

Arizona is an interesting geopolitical context from which to explore this topic given the prevalence of anti-immigrant sentiments in the state, which arguably has implications for successful resettlement of refugee populations. Interviews were conducted with representatives from the refugee resettlement agencies located in Phoenix to ascertain what existing services entailed and what additional services were needed to ensure the self-sufficiency of refugees. Representatives from the agencies were also asked to share views regarding perceptions of refugees held by employers as well as the local community at large. Questions regarding views held by these two stakeholder groups (employers and the community) were included because their views and actions can impede or enhance the attainment of a state of self-sufficiency amongst resettled refugee populations. Ultimately, vis-à-vis the examination of resettlement services offered by refugee resettlement agencies and the resulting degree of self-sufficiency amongst refugee populations, this study contributes to dialogue on the role of community development approaches in facilitating refugees’ attainment of long-term self-sufficiency.

**Refugee Resettlement in Phoenix, Arizona**

In the United States, refugees are admitted through the Refugee Admissions Program (USRAP), which offers a certain number of refugees the opportunity for third-country resettlement every year. USRAP resettled over 58,000 refugees in 2012, representing an “important, enduring, and ongoing expression of [America’s] commitment to international humanitarian principles” (DoS, 2013). The continuous inflow of refugee populations is dispersed amongst various host communities throughout the United States. Refugee based organizations abide by a certain federally mandated process through which strategic plans for US-based refugee programs are determined.

In the state of Arizona, the Arizona Refu-
Refugee Resettlement Program (RRP) is the federally-funded program utilized to administer transitional benefits and employment services in collaboration with locally-based private refugee resettlement agencies commonly referred to as ‘voluntary agencies’ (VOLAGs). They include the International Rescue Committee (IRC); the Catholic Charities Community Services (CC); the Arizona Immigrant and Refugee Services (AIRS); and, the Lutheran Social Services of the Southwest (LSS). VOLAGs in Arizona resettled 2,846 refugees in 2012 and another 3,600 refugees in 2013, with the majority of the refugees arriving from Iraq, Somalia, Sudan, Congo, Cuba, and Myanmar (AZDES, 2013). Although this is just a small fraction of the world’s refugee population, it is a significant number that must be absorbed and resettled by communities within Arizona on a yearly basis.

Refugees entering the Phoenix area are dispersed amongst the aforementioned VOLAGs, and placement is contingent upon the organizational capacity of each agency. The various services provided by these agencies include access to affordable housing; help with immigration and citizenship services; a medical case worker to ensure good health; education services to get children enrolled in schools; basic English lessons; cultural orientations; mental health services; and employment services (AZDES, 2014). These agencies also host and facilitate various training sessions on important topics such as familiarity with American currency, financial management, and public transit systems. In essence, VOLAGs are tasked with providing the appropriate services to integrate refugees into the social and economic fabric of the host community. By so doing, these agencies are responding to a federal mandate under which the Refugee Resettlement Program was created, that
aims to ensure that refugees “achieve economic self-sufficiency as quickly as possible after arrival in the United States” (AZDES, 2014). However, a question of enduring interest is whether the resettlement services provided facilitate a state of self-sufficiency amongst refugee populations.

**Methods**

An interpretive paradigm that draws on interviews as the methodological tool of inquiry was adopted in this study so as to facilitate a more meaningful and in-depth understanding of ‘social phenomenon’ than what can be elicited via purely quantitative methods (Gill, 2008). In-depth interviews were conducted with participants from the voluntary agencies (VOLAGs) located in Phoenix, Arizona to understand the conditions of refugee resettlement and self-sufficiency. The interview guide entailed several semi-structured interview questions that were strategically designed to “define the area to be explored, at least initially, and from which the interviewer or interviewee …[could] diverge to pursue an idea or response in more detail” (Britten, 2006, p.13). The questions posed aimed to elicit in-depth responses reflective of interviewees’ perspectives and experiences with resettlement processes (see Table 1). In cases where clarification was required, probing questions were posed to elicit clear and complete responses (Kvale, 1996; Schwandt, 2007).

Ten representatives from the various VOLAGs were interviewed. This included three participants from the International Rescue Committee (IRC), four participants from the Catholic Charities (CC), and lastly three participants from the Arizona Immigration and Refugee Services (AIRS). The Lutheran Social Services (LSS) was not part of this study due to a self-enforced policy that disallows their participation in any form of research processes. The duration of the interviews ranged from 20-30 minutes in length. The interviewees varied in age (25-50), occupation (employment specialists, case managers, and public relations coordinator), length of occupation (2-10+ years), and gender (2 males and 9 females). All interviewees were American; however, some were naturalized American citizens with refugee backgrounds, having been resettled in Arizona and granted citizenship. The range in demographics helped to ensure that responses were inclusive of a wide-range of perspectives. Participants’ identities remained confidential throughout the study, which encourages them to be more open with their responses. All of the responses were willingly audio-recorded and transcribed verbatim to provide complete data for accurate coding (Pontin, 2000). The coding process involved a deep reading of the transcripts, analytical notes, and the identification of thematic keywords or phrases. The emergent categories were then classified by the questions posed and the participating VOLAG (see Table 1). Approval was sought and granted from the researcher’s university research review board (IRB #00000572).

**Findings**

For the purposes of organization and comparison, a synopsis of the interview responses is provided in Table 1, which is organized horizontally by VOLAG and vertically by the specific question posed (see Table 1). The tabulated information is not ranked in any particular order, and it is followed by a detailed description and interpretation of the individual responses. Due to the similarity in emergent categories related to Questions 2 and 3, Questions 4, 5, and 6, as well as Questions 7 and 8, the responses pertaining to the respective questions were combined. Given space constraints and the lengthy nature of many of the responses, not all aspects of the data are addressed in detail.

**Community Perceptions**

As is indicated in the first row of Table 1, participants indicated that community perceptions regarding refugee resettlement vary and include positive, negative, and impartial perceptions towards refugee populations (see Ta-
ble 1). Participants mentioned that individuals who are accepting of refugees tend to recognize the positive impact refugees have on the local workforce and their contributions to diversity. According to participants, community claims against resettlement in Arizona tend to be influenced by anti-immigrant sentiment, and individuals espousing such views perceive refugees as needy, unable to contribute, and a drain on social services. The neutral perceptions, which seem to be most commonplace, include individuals who are generally unaware of and are

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Research Question Posed to VOLAGs</th>
<th>Refugee Volunteer Agencies (VOLAGs) of Phoenix, Arizona</th>
<th>IRC</th>
<th>CC</th>
<th>AIRS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Q1: What are the host community’s perceptions? | Positive/For:  
- Accepting of refugees  
- Bring diversity  
- Contribute to workforce  
- Contribute to social services | Neutral/Impartial:  
- Unaware  
- Growing awareness  | Negative/Against:  
- Anti-immigrant sentiment  
- Drain on social services | Positive/For:  
- Accepting of refugees  
- Bring diversity |
| Q2: What are employee's concerns about refugees? | Communication issues  
- Illegal workforce  
- Transportation issues  
- Skills gap | Hospitality/Tourism  
- Manufacturing  
- Food Industry  
- Airport  
- Farming | Communication issues  
- Illegal workforce  
- Safety concerns  
- Consistent workforce  
- Skills gap | Communication issues  
- Illegal workforce  
- Safety concerns  
- Consistent workforce |
| Q3: What industries partner with your organization? | Employment  
- Client motivation  
- Understand business expectations  
- Cultural Awareness  
- Access to resources | Employment  
- English competency  
- Access to resources  
- Pre-employment services | Employment  
- English competency  
- Basic needs | Employment  
- English competency  
- Basic needs |
| Q4: What is necessary for the self-sufficiency of refugees? | Employment  
- Basic needs  
- Behavioral Health  
- Job Orientation  
- Microenterprise  
- Home purchase program | Employment  
- Basic needs  
- Orientation Classes (Job, Culture, transportation) | Employment  
- Basic needs  
- Overall care and concern | Employment  
- Basic needs  
- Overall care and concern |
| Q5: What needs are being met well? | Retention  
- Follow-up with client  
- Job satisfaction  
- Skills gap | Retention  
- Follow-up with client  
- Job satisfaction  
- English competency | Retention  
- Follow-up with client  
- Job satisfaction | Retention  
- Follow-up with client  
- Job satisfaction |
| Q6: What is necessary for long-term employment? | Education  
- English proficiency  
- Long-term resettlement  
- Behavioral health | Education  
- Credential Recognition  
- Interpretation services  
- Transportation | Education  
- Culture Classes  
- English proficiency  
- Behavioral health  
- Long-term volunteers | Education  
- Culture Classes  
- English proficiency  
- Behavioral health  
- Long-term volunteers |
| Q7: What needs are not currently being adequately met? | Employment  
- Basic Needs  
- Social Status  
- Healthcare  
- Education | Employment  
- Basic Needs  
- Social Status  
- Healthcare  
- Culture/language barriers  
- Transportation | Employment  
- Basic Needs  
- Social status  
- Healthcare  
- Culture/language barriers | Employment  
- Basic Needs  
- Social status  
- Healthcare  
- Culture/language barriers |

Table 1: Summary of Findings
“I think people in Phoenix accept refugees. I have never seen any American treat refugees poorly...”

oblivious to the degree to which resettlement is taking place in Phoenix.

Through her active involvement with the public, Nancy (IRC) recognizes the importance of a “welcoming community where structures are set up to allow folks who are on the fringes to become a part of the community.” However, there tends to be “a general lack of awareness” among community members when it comes to the number of refugees resettling and working in Phoenix, “one of the largest receiving cities in the country,” says Macy (CC). Based on her experiences working at the IRC, Ellen believes Phoenix is generally a welcoming community but qualifies this view saying “perhaps the people that tend to gravitate to the IRC are already globally-minded and aware.” Georgia (CC) adds that “whether or not a person is aware of the refugee concept,” she feels that, “there is an overall feeling that this population is a drain on our social services here.” In which case, people do not realize that VOLAGs are purposed for rapidly preparing refugees to be self-sufficient, ensuring they become contributing members of society.

Although the responses varied, participants with refugee backgrounds tended to be much more optimistic about the host community’s perceptions of refugees. Perhaps, their positive experience resettling in the U.S. has shaped their generalizations about host communities as being accepting. Throughout the resettlement process, refugees can be sheltered from negative sentiment by the resettlement staff and volunteers involved in the resettlement process who actively advocate on their behalf. Although it is difficult to make generalizations based on the limited number of interviews, it is possible that these participants have been sheltered or are in denial of negative sentiments that might exist within the community, so as to affirm their own identity as a naturalized citizen and a member of the community.

Adam (IRC), Ashley (AIRS), Sarah (AIRS), and Allison (CC) all expressed their belief that the local community is very open and willing to accept refugees:

“There are a good number of refugees in AZ. New arrivals are placed in communities where refugees are already living. People in the area are realizing that, and they are getting more and more used to refugees.”

(Sarah, AIRS)

“There is never worry that refugees are going to take ‘our’ jobs. Also, upon arrival, they automatically get legal immigration status and begin working jobs when they have obtained work permits.”

(Allison, CC)

“I think people in Phoenix accept refugees. I have never seen any American treat refugees poorly. With my clients, no one has reported discrimination.”

(Ashley, AIRS)

“I truly believe the community accepts refugees warmly. In this environment, I have not seen any negative perceptions. Host communities are very supportive in my experience working with refugees.”

(Adam, IRC)

Certainly, VOLAGs are keen to readily provide their services to assist refugees, but does this reflect the willingness of the larger community to absorb refugee populations?

Some interviewees felt that many people, if aware or when made aware, tend to hold misconceptions about refugee populations, and that
refugees within the Phoenix area are particularly vulnerable to existing anti-immigration sentiments. Even within a welcoming community, refugees can and tend to be stigmatized as being “vulnerable” and “needy”. Although a reality in certain cases, this is not entirely representative of the resilience that refugees exhibit throughout the resettlement process. James (AIRS) believes that people are prone to stereotyping refugees, which is reinforced by mainstream media coverage:

“The majority of the time people think refugees are: from Africa, they live in a camp, don’t have water, they are what you see on TV. They are often portrayed [by the media] as uneducated, unable to contribute to the community, and burdensome. Most people think we are stupid for bringing them here because we have enough trouble with our own homeless and unemployed, so why bring more?”

James’ last statement regarding competition for employment sheds light on the anti-immigrant sentiments that exist in Phoenix. Jody (CC) states that “there is absolutely a need to increase awareness, but it’s a bit tricky because people don’t understand the difference between immigrants and refugees.” That is, problems arise when refugees become confused with “illegal immigrants” due to the negative sentiment in Arizona.

As the responses imply, community perceptions tend to vary depending on an individual’s understanding of refugee populations. Whereas a receptive community can positively influence and support the resettlement process, negative sentiments can complicate and deter this process. Considering the likelihood that the majority of community members tend to be somewhat unaware of the extent resettlement taking place and the negative sentiment surrounding immigration in Arizona, increasing awareness about incoming refugee populations could hinder the resettlement process. Rather, it is through the power of advocacy that VOLAGs must work from the bottom-up within the community to ensure a positive understanding of refugee populations.

**Employer Perceptions**

This section integrates Questions 2 and 3, which evaluates employer’s perceptions of refugees and the industries that employ refugees (see Table 1). Since misconceptions about refugees or anti-immigrant sentiment exist in the community, employers can become overly cautious about the risks and legality of hiring refugees. James (AIRS) explains that “Arizonans have higher walls built because of negative sentiments about immigration, [and] many people equate refugees with illegal immigrants and believe they are taking our jobs.” Participants explained that when a resettlement agency initially engages with new employers, they tend to have multiple concerns including communication issues, hiring illegal workers, skills gap, safety, and transportation to work site (see Q1 of Table 1).

Employer’s perceptions also vary depending on whether they have a long-standing relationship with a VOLAG. Georgia (CC) articulates how perceptions are influenced by an employer’s experience in hiring refugees:

“Employers that we work with have had positive experiences; they will readily pick up the phone and reach out to us if they need more workers. For the new ones, the results vary depending on the nature of the job. One bad experience could deter them from partnering with us later.”

According to Adam (IRC), initiating sustainable relationships with local employers is a result of “good advocacy” on the agency’s behalf by “being on the front-line as a representing agency of refugee populations.” There are a number of industries in Phoenix that have interdependent relationships with VOLAGs and rely on refugees to meet their staffing needs.

Although some of these industries overlap, they generally encompass hospitality and tourism (including local airports), manufacturing & production, dairy & farm labor, janitorial & cleaning services, landscaping, as well as food
preparation and dishwashers (see Q3 in Table 1). All of these industries depend heavily on entry-level positions that necessitate a minimal skill-set and little to no English competency. In a political environment wherein employing undocumented immigrants is increasingly problematic, legally hiring refugees presents a philanthropic and viable solution to meeting workforce needs. James (AIRS) describes the employers that he works with as “willing and anxious to accept more refugees because they are good, consistent, and dependable” workers. Employers that have long-standing relationships with VOLAGs welcome their services and rely on refugees to meet their staffing needs. Hence, when reaching out to new employers, good advocacy helps to overcome employer fears, establish long-term relationships with local employers, and ensure sustainable employment opportunities for new refugee arrivals.

Refugee Self-Sufficiency

Questions 4, 5, and 6 have been combined in this section (see Table 1) because the services offered by VOLAGs are oriented around ensuring the self-sufficiency of refugees. In the context of refugee resettlement, self-sufficiency is essentially a refugee’s ability to fully meet his/her own needs, independent of social services. A list of components necessary to achieve what agencies refer to as rapid self-sufficiency (focused on economic aspects) was compiled from the responses: employment, English competency, client motivation, meeting employer expectations, pre-employment services, and ease of access to resources (see Q4 in Table 4). These services aim to help refugees to overcome barriers to employment and are designed to alleviate concerns and misconceptions commonly held by employers.

Each participant recognized the importance of employment with the majority identifying it as the most critical step a refugee can take in becoming self-sufficient, or “economically self-sufficient”, as articulated by Jody (CC). Allison (CC) points out that “job placement is the most important step for the self-sufficiency plan of the U.S. Government… [whereby] refugees are expected to start working as soon as possible.” This federal-level influence is foundational to the structure of each VOLAG. At the most basic level, “the resettlement program is essentially an employment program,” says Sarah (AIRS), considering most of the services are
oriented around preparing refugees to support themselves.

Ashley (AIRS) values employment because according to her “whenever [her] clients find a job, the obstacles start to diminish.” For the majority of the clients, Jody agrees that “yes, employment is considered a positive step for those clients who are ‘well-adjusted’ or without many barriers; [however], for some cases such as those not quite ready to enter employment, issues manifest [and] can turn into job hopping.”

As far as sustainable employment is concerned, an unstable job history hinders a refugee’s ability to be self-sufficient. Therefore, pre and post employment services offered by resettlement agencies are essential for ensuring rapid job placement and employment retention (Halpern, 2008).

Access to immediate employment within these industries is suitable for refugees who tend to have very few skills (relevant in the U.S. labor market) due to limited work experience, education, and English proficiency (Bruno, 2011). For these unskilled individuals, rapid-employment can be an empowering step that puts them on a path toward long-term self-sufficiency. Because VOLAGs are primarily tasked with rapidly employing refugees, available services can fall short of meeting additional needs such as persisting gaps in language acquisition, job retention, access to education, professional certifications, and difficulty adjusting, which collectively can result in challenges to long-term self-sufficiency (AZDES, 2010).

Various scholars have criticized resettlement practices for overlooking the skill sets that refugees bring with them, particularly those who have received a formal education. Bruno (2011) explains that refugees, who were professionals in their home countries, have their own set of challenges because they are typically unable to find comparable jobs in the United States (p.19). Hence, there is a tendency in resettlement countries whereby:

“The loss of occupational status among refugee arrivals in reality means that doctors and engineers drive taxis; previous lecturers work as teachers’ assistants; a sociologist works as an underground miner, a helicopter pilot becomes a courier; economists, accountants and teachers work as cleaners.” (Colic-Peisker & Tibury, 2006, p.213)

Studies by Lamba (2003) and Bruno (2011) have found that a refugee's human capital such as foreign educational credentials and professional skills tend to hold little value within their host communities in the U.S. and Canada. When skilled refugees are forced to accept low-skilled jobs in order to meet the demand for immediate economic self-sufficiency, this can have adverse effects on their long-term self-sufficiency. Constable et al., (2004) state that the professional skills of refugees begin to degenerate with time, which decreases the likeliness that they will reach previous levels of professionalism in the future. Ideally, support and services could be better tailored to match a refugee’s particular skillset, thereby ensuring their long-term self-sufficiency by means of gainful employment, which will benefit the host community in the long run.

According to each participant, the key to long-term employment for skilled and unskilled refugees is job retention, because it offers a path to not just rapid, but long-term self-sufficiency. Georgia (CC) prioritizes retention, saying “we will work with them to do anything necessary to help them keep their position” in order to establish a job history and begin building a resume in the US. Such retention-oriented approaches include follow-up with clients and employers, interpretation services, job-readiness training, and goal setting (see Q6 in Table 1). Follow-up helps VOLAGs to evaluate the job satisfaction of clients, advocate for job promotion, and ensure that employee expectations are being met.

Adam (IRC) firmly believes in the importance of job retention for ensuring self-sufficiency of his clients:

“Placement is a small part of the process.
Everybody can place, but retention is the recipe for success. Retention guarantees long-term employment, promotion, an increase in hourly wage, benefits, and everything else the company can give to the clients. Plus, reduces the stress on the employer...so it's a win-win situation. We place, they stay, we follow-up, we serve new arrivals. Retention is number one!"

Adam speaks from his experience as a refugee and his many years of experience working with employers and refugee clients. In general, although VOLAGs are quite successful in ensuring rapid employment for most of their clients, a greater focus on job retention is the key to securing long-term self-sufficiency. There seem to be other factors that lead to job retention beyond just rapid employment.

**Unmet Needs and Concerns**

This section presents findings from Questions 7 and 8 (see Table 1), which are related to unmet needs and concerns voiced by refugees. The responses to these questions are combined because some concerns exhibited by refugees and shared amongst VOALGs shed light on particular needs that are not being met by resettlement agencies. The needs and concerns of refugees go far beyond attaining immediate employment. In fact, their concerns, as articulated by VOLAG representatives, during resettlement include language barriers, social status, education, transportation, basic needs, cultural barriers, and healthcare (See Q8 of Table 1).

All of these concerns vary by refugee, but can impact their immediate well-being and long-term self-sufficiency. Ellen (IRC) points out that “the fears and concerns people have really depended on where they came from, what situation they are coming from, and what type of life they were living.” Nancy (IRC) recognizes that “we here in the US really push for employment, and we front load the training that we do in order to get refugees employed and self-sufficient,” but remains concerned “about the long-term... what about the lingering services that are needed, but are not always available?” According to VOLAG representatives, there are various unmet needs that inhibit or hinder self-sufficiency amongst refugees. These unmet needs include education, recognition of credentials, English proficiency, interpretation services, transportation, and behavioral health (see Q7 in Table 1). Although these services are critical to the resettlement process, funds and resources are limited (Bruno, 2011).

Ellen (IRC), as did most participants, recognizes that “the length of time between refugees’ arrival in the United States and when they are expected to learn English and to be fully self-sufficient is not always realistic.” VOLAGs are limited to providing support for only a period of 90-180 days following refugees’ arrival in order to accommodate the continuous inflow of refugees (DoS, 2013). The reality, however, is that the resettlement program beginning at the federal level is structured as an employment program with the goal of achieving rapid economic self-sufficiency for all incoming refugees. This presents a challenge for Jody (CC) who recognizes that “some clients come from more difficult situations and need more time to adjust, but don’t have that luxury” because of the nature of the resettlement program. For some clients, Sarah (AIRS) says, “it is hard for them to work because of English skills or age... Clients that are unable to work can get up to 8 months of cash assistance from the Department of Economic Security, but after that, they are on their own.” The most critical cases involve individuals with behavioral health issues:

“I wish we could offer more behavioral health and more group therapy opportunities for people because working with certain refugees you begin to notice cases of post-traumatic stress disorder and depression. Part of the issue is that we are only able to serve so many people through the funding that we have, and there is also the refugee’s willingness to receive that behavioral health help (Nancy, IRC).
For individuals that suffer from behavioral health issues, it’s not just a lack of appropriate services that inhibits them from being helped, but also the fear of a stigmatizing diagnosis. There are therefore a variety of circumstances that pose challenges to self-sufficiency of vulnerable refugees, making them more susceptible to unemployment and homelessness.

Although some refugees arrive with minimal skill sets, there are also those that arrive with professional experience and foreign degrees. Adam (IRC) recognizes that “some refugees express concerns about education; however, this is not the primary goal for refugee resettlement.” Allison (CC) and Nancy (IRC), respectively, articulate this dilemma well:

“...everything is being done well, except for educational needs. Some refugees come with educational backgrounds... doctors come with their credentials, some with master’s or bachelor’s... the goal is to employ them as fast as possible. We try to have their degrees evaluated to see if the credentials match US standards, but most people aren’t able to continue in their field of study.”

“We do as much as possible, though it is difficult for a former doctor or engineer. Some folks in those positions may be unwilling to be a dishwasher or a cleaner, understandably so. The way the employment program is set up here... requires them to be willing to take the first job.”

James (AIRS) recognizes that “if [refugees] can’t speak [English], it will hold them back from a lot,” even if they have skills. It is thus important that services are provided to empower refugees to utilize the skills they already have as well as enable them to master the English language so as to enable them to better embark on the road to self-sufficiency.

Discussion

According to the VOLAG representatives, perceptions related to refugees held by Arizonans vary. Some community members support refugee initiatives, others are against any such endeavors, and yet other groups are oblivious or impartial in their views of refugees relocating to Arizona. This does not come as a surprise considering that community perceptions are seldom homogeneous. VOLAG representatives were generally optimistic about the receptiveness expressed by the greater Phoenix community in relation to refugees. However, limited evidence was provided to substantiate these claims. The tendency for some interviewees to regard the Phoenix community as receptive to refugees can
be attributed to the postulation that community members who collaborate with VOLAGs generally exhibit a level of global awareness and genuine compassion towards displaced peoples. Perhaps the community's receptiveness towards refugees is attributable to the community's recognition of the ordinary experiences that more accurately characterize displaced peoples (Marlowe, 2009). The espousal of such positive attitudes towards refugees allows community members to regard them as “peers in social life, capable of meaningful contributions to family, community, and society” (p.190). Positive perceptions, therefore, might reflect both the philanthropic desire among community members to help refugees, but also the recognition of the contributions that new residents have to offer.

On the other hand, negative sentiments towards refugees are generally informed by a variety of misconceptions, fears, or ill assumptions that portray refugees as needy, unable to contribute, and/or are a drain on social services. Attitudes of this nature can be explained by the ‘narrative of trauma,’ which tends to overemphasize the extraordinary experiences of refugees (Kirmayer & Narasiah, 2011, Pumariega, 2005, Birman & Basu, 2005). Such hardline characterizations of refugees overlook their resilience and meaningful integration in the community and propagate accounts that may influence the ways in which they view themselves.

The findings coincide with the spectrum of views, both for and against, the enforcement of Arizona's immigration laws, which has certainly faced opposition but generally purports the existence of anti-immigration sentiments that are encapsulated by Arizona Senate Bill 1070. The bill aims “to discourage and deter the unlawful entry and presence of illegal aliens and economic activity by persons”. According to Esse (2012), negative attitudes towards immigration often arise when the host community feels it must compete with immigrants for economic resources, as is the case in Arizona. Similarly, Martinez-Brawley and Zorita (2001) state that Southwestern communities are often concerned that immigrants, particularly undocumented Mexican workers, are taking locals’ jobs. In the case of Arizona, VOLAG representatives interviewed in this study bemoaned the fact that their efforts towards resettlement and job placement are often complicated by some community members’ inability to differentiate between refugees and illegal immigrants.

Refugee resettlement in Arizona has not faced notable confrontation by the greater Phoenix community in part due to a general lack of awareness regarding the occurrence and extent of the refugee resettlement initiatives in the region. This state of oblivion may, however, render refugees vulnerable to anti-immigrant sentiments, especially if the distinction between refugees and immigrants is unclear to the host community. From a community development perspective, it can be argued that the views held by the community members towards resettled refugees can enhance or hinder the integration of refugee populations. Perceptions held by community members can create environments of inclusion that empower refugees to meaningfully contribute to their new communities. Conversely, negative perceptions towards refugee populations can hinder refugee integration in any given community and hamper efforts towards self-sufficiency.

In a political environment wherein employing undocumented immigrants is increasingly problematic, the legality of employing refugees presents a viable solution to meeting the workforce needs faced by many American based businesses. For instance, a variety of industries in the Phoenix area are dependent on an entry-level workforce and as a result, such industries are receptive of refugee populations. These industries are suitable for unskilled refugees who have limited work experience, education, and English proficiency (Bruno, 2011). Similar industries in Australia, however, have been accused of constructing low-level employment niches that limit upward mobility through structural and dis-
criminatory practices (Colic-Piesker & Tibury, 2006). VOLAGs in Arizona try to mitigate employer exploitation of refugees by establishing transparent and long-standing partnerships with the employers by conducting follow-up appointments with employed refugees.

Despite the fact that VOLAGs in Arizona are largely successful in achieving rapid employment for refugees, this focus often falls short in terms of achieving long-term self-sufficiency. Skilled refugees are perhaps the most underutilized and underrepresented category of refugees. The findings indicate that there are a numerous unmet needs, as articulated by VOLAGs, which inhibit refugees’ attainment of long-term self-sufficiency. From a grassroots community development perspective, this problem can be remedied through active engagement of refugee populations in the further identification of unmet needs and the creation of interventions that can address long-term and sustainable measures to attaining refugee self-sufficiency. Understandably, VOLAGs have limited resources, but perhaps educating the broader host communities as to the benefits of catering to refugee populations can foster an environment in which the host community takes ownership of the situation and endeavors to develop strategies that complement and complete the initiatives and programs created by VOLAGs.

**Conclusion**

The following excerpt from the 2014 Proposal for Refugee Admissions provides a somewhat picturesque view of refugee resettlement in the America:

“While starting life anew in the United States presents considerable challenges, it also creates unparalleled hope and provides opportunity for a new beginning for tens of thousands of persons each year. The support and assistance that average Americans provide to these newcomers greatly helps them integrate into our country. Refugees add to America’s vitality and diversity by making substantial contributions to our economic and cultural life.” (DoS, 2014)

In order to substantiate these federal-level claims about refugee resettlement, more research ought to be conducted to evaluate: the influence of the socio-political climates, at the host community level, on the reception of refugees as well as on refugees’ likelihood of attaining self-sufficiency; the economic and social contributions that refugees offer to host communities; and, the impact of participatory research approaches to refugee needs assessment and creation of interventions that facilitate self-sufficiency amongst refugees and community integration.

U.S. Refugee Resettlement Program (RRP) has expressed a commitment to adapting their services to “meet the changing needs of refugees” (DoS, 2014). In light of this commitment, resettlement programs ought to look beyond “[achieving] economic self-sufficiency as quickly as possible after arrival in the United States” (AZDES, 2014) and expand programs that ensure independence in the long-run. As the findings suggest, the current approach to resettlement fails to recognize the varying needs of refugees required to attain long-term self-sufficiency. Thus, RRP should consider implementing a two-pillared approach focused on long-term economic self-sufficiency by the means of extensive employment and educational services. A restructured focus would benefit incoming refugees by empowering them to learn English and enhance their skill set, thereby leading to gainful long-term employment.

Considering federal funding for resettlement is already limited, VOLAGs should explore the possibility of community resources and partnerships. For instance, within the business community, VOLAGs can work in conjunction with local employers to capitalize on corporate social responsibility (CSR) opportunities. CSR is the means by which companies work to positively impact the communities within which they operate. Employers can contribute to some of the unmet needs by providing educational incentives to their employees (e.g.
language acquisition classes). Such opportunities that facilitate upward mobility would empower refugees, particularly unskilled refugees. A more in-depth understanding of the needs of refugees would facilitate the identification of appropriate community-based resources that can be allocated towards refugees to enable them to attain long-term self-sufficiency. Conversely, host communities can also be involved in the co-construction of interventions that facilitate refugees’ attainment of self-sufficiency and community integration.

References


